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 Realpolitik and African Nationalism:  
Labour Britain and Angola in the 1960s* 
 
Abstract: Salazar’s dictatorship was the opposite of western democracy principles, but neither London 
nor Washington could forget the importance of Portugal as a NATO allied country. Moreover, white re-
gimes in Southern Africa granted the stability necessary to pursue Anglo-Saxon interests. According to 
both Atlantic capitals, white settlers did not have any intention to give up and African nationalists did not 
have the military and economic strength to defeat them. When Salazar was succeeded by Caetano, Down-
ing Street thought he would bring modernisation, by accepting foreign companies to develop the econ-
omy, especially in Angola where oil and diamonds were being exported, and also by at least accepting the 
principle of self-determination. However, emancipation and equality of races was something on which 
African nationalists and black independent States could not tolerate any compromise. Once the process of 
political independence had been started, the following step was the achievement of economic sovereignty 
on a basis that old times diplomacy and cold war estimates were no longer able to understand.        
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Introduction 
«In the twentieth century […] the most striking of all the impressions I have formed 
[…] is of the strength of this African national consciousness».1
                                                 
* TA4eae 
 Through the so-called 
“Wind of Change Speech” before the South African Parliament on February 3, 1960, 
the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, marked a watershed moment for black 
nationalism in Africa. In a few words, Macmillan acknowledged that black people were 
claming the sacred right to rule themselves. It was the first public statement of Britain's 
acknowledgement of majority rules questions in Africa. The address was received in 
quite different ways across the continent. Black nationalists in Southern Africa consid-
ered Britain's stand a promising call to arms, whilst other African Commonwealth coun-
tries started achieving independence. The first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, 
claimed the importance of African unity to develop a continent endowed with so much 
wealth. Only a strong political union could bring about full and effective development 
of Africa’s natural resources: «[…] Africans have, indeed, begun to think continentally. 
1 Harold Macmillan’s ”Wind of Change” Speech, Made to the South Africa Parliament on 




[…] To suggest that the time is not yet ripe for considering a political union of Africa is 
to evade the facts and ignore realities […]. The emergence of such a mighty stabilising 
force in this strife-worn world should be regarded […] as a practical proposition, which 
the peoples of Africa can, and should, translate into reality».2
     On the other hand, the descendants of white settlers in Southern Africa did not share 
the same point of view. As an example of that, suffice it to quote the South African 
Prime Minister, Henrik Frensch Verwoerd, who responded to Macmillan that doing jus-
tice meant to be just not only to black Africans, but also to the white man of Africa. He 
declared himself proud that the white people had «[…] brought civilisation here», and 
had «[…] made the present developments of black nationalists possible. By bringing 
them education, by showing them this way of life, by bringing in industrial develop-
ment, by bringing in the ideals which western civilisation has developed itself».
 
3
     Another negative response to Macmillan’s initiative came from Antonio de Oliveira 
Salazar, the dictator of Portugal. According to the Prime Minister of the Latin country, 
African elites did not exist in sufficient number and at all levels to justify the admini-
stration of government, as well as private enterprises. Therefore, he was persuaded that 
the new States in the black continent would run the risk of finding themselves in a situa-
tion of subjugation even worse. Such pace towards self-determination, he carried on in a 
statement of 1963, was based on two wrong premises, that is anti-white racism and the 
alleged unity of the peoples of the continent. That was the way to subordinate black 
people to the Arabs, while rejecting all that white men had brought. For these reasons, 
the Portuguese tyrant thought that the development of those territories would only be 
possible on a multiracial ground, with responsibilities in any field to the most qualified, 
regardless of their colour.
  
4
                                                 
2 K. NKRUMAH, I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology, 1961, in www.marxists.org. 
 Portuguese colonialists affirmed that it was possible to apply 
the principle of nationalism to territories where not even the embryo of a nationality had 
ever existed. Such a statement was based on the theory according to which no racial dis-
tinction was implemented in Portuguese overseas provinces and in no part of such lands 
3 Hendrik Verwoerd’s Response to the ‘Winds of Change’ Speech, South Africa Parliament February 3, 
1960, in http://africanhistory.about.com. 
4 See A. DE OLIVEIRA SALAZAR, The Civilzed Man’s Burden, extracted from The Road for the Future, 
1963, in R.H. CHILCOTE, Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents, Stanford, CA, Hoover 
Institution Press, Stanford University, 1972, pp. 2-4.   
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there was anything but Portuguese nationalism. Lusitanian communities in Africa, it 
was stated, mingled whites and blacks with the same fervour and pride. In light of this, 
the white man in Lusitanian African colonies had to be obedient to the word of the 
Commandment and undertake the responsibility not to abandon the populations come 
into contact with civilisation. The Portuguese dictatorship did not want quit its posses-
sions overseas, claiming to be representatives of the material and moral values of West-
ern and Christian Catholic civilisation. Finally, we had better not forget what Salazar’s 
supporters proudly said on their role against the communist threat in the Third World. In 
fact, the Portuguese Government was always ready to remind the Atlantic Powers that 
the necessities of the defence on Europe were not compatible with the African policies 
of the Soviet bloc.5 As a matter of fact, there was no chance for African nationalist 
claims to be hosted in the Latin capital, for even reformist colonialists shared the idea 
that Africa had gained when the Europeans implanted there the concepts of State and 
nation. As regarded in particular the area South of the Sahara, the Portuguese formula of 
assimilation was considered as the most beneficial for the black population. In conse-
quence of that, the Portuguese were there to permanently stay, and the Africans who had 
chosen a path of detachment from the mother-country were by then heading either to-
wards a kind of neo-colonial servitude, or a return to primitive conditions.6
     Words like these reminded speeches addressed in South Africa, whose government 
had issued apartheid laws in 1948 as a pretext to implement the progress of each race 
keeping them apart from each other, thus protecting civilization and Christianity from 
what was regarded as barbarism and heathenism. Rather than separateness, Portuguese 
colonialism was based on the concept of assimilation, which in the XX century had ac-
quired new roots in the so-called Lusotropicalism, a sociological theory published by 
the Brazilian scholar Gilberto Freyre. According to him, a common culture and social 
order among people of different ethnic groups and culture had been spread in tropical 
areas due to Lusitanian experience and experimentation. In light of this, Freyre wrote 
that tropical regions were becoming adapted to European life styles, not only through 
technology, but also and especially through political art. This was supposed to imply 
  
                                                 
5 Cfr. A.J. DE CASTRO FERNANDES, Unity and the Nation, extracted from The Presence of Portugal in 
Africa, 1961, ibid., pp. 5-10.  




that foreign values were brought into harmony with native culture and habits, thus revi-
talising them.7 In a few words, the Brazilian sociologist viewed Lusotropicalism as a 
sort of capacity for miscegenation that the Portuguese were supposed to have, with a 
particular composition of cultural contributions from the native indigenous populations, 
the black slaves, and the Portuguese. One of the reasons was probably the fact that the 
Portuguese were already the product of a similar process of cultural and racial miscege-
nation. Freyre’s ideas  fitted nicely with the regime’s strategy to present the Portuguese 
empire as a multiracial and multi-continental nation. He considered also that Lusotropi-
cal culture was a form of resistance against both the Soviet communist influence, and 
also the process of Americanisation.  As an outcome, this theory was taught in Portugal 
at the social and political science institutes, feeding the popular perception of the excep-
tional character of Portuguese colonialism and the absence of racism in that.8
     Actually, colonies like Angola and Mozambique, or “Overseas Provinces”, as they 
had been renamed in 1951, were clearly seen as African and a different “constitution” 
was in force until 1961, when the “Estatuto do Indigenato” was abolished. With an 
economy based on forced labour, people had been divided into three legal categories: 
citizens, i.e. the Portuguese; indigenous or natives, also referred to as uncivilised, or un-
assimilated; and “assimilated”. Officially it was possible for any African or mulatto to 
be classified as such. However, they had to undergo a probation period and exams in 
order to prove that they were Christian, dressed in European fashion, were monoga-
mous, and spoke, read, and wrote fluent Portuguese. Moreover, they had to earn wages 
from a trade, maintain a standard of living similar to European ones and have no police 
record. They never amounted to more than one per cent and the main reason for that 
was due to the extremely small number of Africans having access to institutions able to 
impart Portuguese civilisation in a colony where still in 1950 ninety-seven per cent of 
children over the age of 15 were classified as illiterate. Apart from that, although the 
system was not legally based on race, its implementation was, as any mulatto who did 
  
                                                 
7 See G. FREYRE, Integration and Lusotropicology, extracted from Portuguese Integration in the Tropics, 
1961, ibid., pp. 19-22.  
8 See M. VALE DE ALMEIDA, Portugal’s Colonial Complex: From Colonial Lusotropicalism to Postcolo-
nial Lusophony, Queen’s Postcolonial Research Forum Queen’s University, Belfast, April  28, 2008, in 
http://miguelvaledealmeida.net. 
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not live in the bush and all whites were automatically classified as civilised, thus deduc-
ing their cultural level from their complexion, while Africans who had a high level of 
culture and lived in a European style were denied such a status it they only showed a 
few hints of their original ethnic identity. In brief, assimilation meant the complete an-
nihilation of African culture and practices. Finally, assimilated people were only re-
cruited in the lowest ranks of the public administration.9
     On the other hand, if we have a look at African nationalists’ documents we easily 
realise how harsh the legacy of European domination was. As concerned in particular 
Angola, two principles were first contested. The former said that no black person could 
own land, and that was why all the good land had gradually passed into the hands of 
white farmers; the latter had established forced labour after the abolition of slavery in 
1878. Following these principles, a third one had been set up in modern times, which 
denied any cultural expression of Angolan identity on grounds of the country being no 
longer a colony, but an overseas province of Portugal.
   
10 Moreover, rejecting allegations 
identifying African independence struggles with a mere subjugation to international 
communism, the Angolan poet Mário de Andrade wrote that until then two factors had 
essentially prevented the development of a successful national liberation movement. In 
the first place, he said, the isolation imposed by the colonial system and by the tyranni-
cal regime in Portugal herself had been able to keep Angola as one of the most obscure 
and silent zones in Africa. Secondly, secrecy had deprived political organisations from 
contact with the masses. At the same time, the Salazar regime had raised a propaganda 
system portraying its African colonies as an example of territorial integration and cul-
tural assimilation, thus making them the only places in the continent where the fight for 
independence had never acquired a legal character.11
                                                 
9 See G.J. BENDER, Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality, London, Heinemann, 1978, 
pp. 149-153. 
 The fracture between Portugal’s 
colonialism and African struggle for independence was becoming wider and wider. As 
an evidence of this, suffice is to quote what Viriato da Cruz stated in 1960: «[…] The 
nature of Portuguese colonialism is such that it cannot permit the peaceful methods we 
10 See Le colonialisme et l’Afrique, extracted from «A Voz da Nação Angolana», I, 1, September 15, 
1960, in CHILCOTE, Emerging Nationalism, cit., pp. 142-144.  
11 See M. DE ANDRADE, Angolan Nationalism, extracted from «Tribuna Socialista (Paris)», 6-7, February-




should like to pursue in order to obtain our independence. The hatred our people have 
for Portuguese colonialism can explode at any moment».12
     The economic backwardness caused by the existence of forced labour and the spolia-
tion of all rights and liberties guaranteed by the Universal Declarations of the Rights of 
Man was also denounced by Holden Roberto, leader of the União das Populações de 
Angola (UPA): «[…] The African worker is obliged to abandon everything […] for the 
compulsory accomplishment of work for a Portuguese master. For twelve months this 
unhappy deportee is some sort of beast of the field […]. Upon his return […], he all too 
often finds his home and family in a pitiable state and his lands confiscated on the pre-





1. The Kennedy Legacy: The Beginning of the National Liberation War and the Atlantic 
Reactions 
 
Angolan nationalists were persuaded that the “wind of change” that had seized the 
whole continent had become a sort of new balance of power in the world. The only risk 
of altering this equilibrium could come from anachronistic opposition to the legitimate 
aspirations of the African peoples. In view of this national awakening, they believed it 
was by then appropriate to invite Portugal to recognise the right of self-determination of 
all people subject to Portuguese colonial administration.14
                                                 
12 V. DA CRUZ, Speech to Second Conference of Solidarity with Afro-Asian Peoples, April 11-15, 1960, 
ibid., pp. 202-204. 
 In a situation like this, it had 
become inevitable for all tension to burst into flames. The fuse was lit on January 3, 
1961, in cotton plantations in the region of Baixa de Cassanje, Malanje, in Northen An-
gola. The peasants boycotted the cotton fields where they worked, demanding better 
working conditions and higher wages to Cotonang, a company owned by Portuguese, 
British and German investors. Challenging the authorities, the peasants burned their 
identification cards and attacked Portuguese traders. The following day, the Portuguese 
military responded by bombing villages in the area. The point was that cotton growing 
13 See H. ROBERTO, Memorandum to the United Nations, 1960, ibid., pp. 66-70; H. ROBERTO, Press 
Statement, 1961, ibid., pp. 70-73. 
14 See M. DE ANDRADE-V. DA CRUZ, Appeal to the United Nations, September 13, 1960, ibid., pp. 236-
239. 
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was a risky enterprise, for the plant had been introduced in areas where fertility was too 
low to grow commercial harvest, which could also entirely fail due to drought or locust 
plague. As a consequence of this, very few white farmers were interested in this activ-
ity, so much so that the government decided to compel Angolan subjects to grow cotton, 
despite regular spasms of starvation. Already in 1945 alarm reports had reached Lisbon, 
but Salazar responded that such a problem was only a product of Bantu imagination, 
and ordered to pursue the cotton policy with vigour and drive “lazy” Africans to work 
even harder.15 On February 4, 1961, fifty nationalist militants in Luanda stormed a po-
lice station and São Paulo prison, killing seven policemen. Forty of them were killed, 
and none of the prisoners were freed. The government held a funeral for the deceased 
police officers, during which the Portuguese citizens committed random acts of violence 
against the ethnic black majority living in Luanda's slums (musseques). The transforma-
tion crossing Africa in those years made Portugal face huge problems in Angola, where 
the black middle-class was very small. Moreover, nationalist leaders themselves had 
different ideas on the post-colonial society to build up. Some colonial students, for ex-
ample, kept covert ties with white communists, but had developed a kind of socialism 
linked to Protestant Christianity of Methodist schools in Luanda. Instead, exiles in Kin-
shasa shared a capitalistic ethos acquired in Baptist missions both in Angola and in co-
lonial Congo. This had led to the formation of two rival political parties – that is 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the União dos Povos de An-
gola (UPA), known as Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) from 1961 – 
competing with each other, as well as the Portuguese, in the forthcoming war for inde-
pendence. As an outcome of this, any sign of Angolan insubordination was met with 
excessive panic and repression, and the regime let white settlers get armed as vigilantes 
and then conscripted an expeditionary force to restore colonial authority.16
                                                 
15 See D. BIRMINGHAM, A Short History of Modern Angola, London, Hurst & Company, 2015, p. 70.   
 In the mean-
time, a dip in the coffee market had meant that workers were not being paid on time. 
Hence, they peacefully marched to ask for their arrears, but again this caused white 
panic and gunfire. Counter-attacks were this time orchestrated across northern border 
and on March 15, the UPA launched an incursion into Angola from its base in Congo, 
16 See D. BIRMINGHAM, Empire in Africa: Angola and Its Neighbors, Athens, OH, Ohio University Press, 




taking farms, government outposts, and trading centres, killing officials and white and 
black civilians. It was the start of the Portuguese Colonial War.  
     Meanwhile, the process of decolonisation gained pace. In April 1960 Eric Louw, For-
eign Minister of South Africa, had predicted that white rule would soon be confined to 
the colonial territories of Southern Africa, including South Africa. Colonial powers 
were being accused of relinquishing the white man, thus allowing communist penetra-
tion into the continent. Verwoerd added that British colonial rule was now running away 
from Africa, adopting “non-racialism” as a euphemism for promoting black interests.17 
Such discrimination policies in Southern Africa were seen as a threat to British colonial 
rule, but it was also impossible to ignore the antagonism between Africans and Europe-
ans that the apartheid was provoking.18 As concerned the Americans, they were per-
suaded that the white minority would be able to maintain dominance for a few more 
years, as Africans were still too weak and unorganised.19
                                                 
17 See J. BARBER - J. BARRATT, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945-
1988, Cambridge-Melbourne-New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 76.    
 In a National Intelligence Es-
timate of August 1961, we can read that Pan-Africanism was regarded as a mystical 
concept based on black racial kinship and glorifying African personality and culture, but 
with no concrete programme to implement. Nevertheless, no African leader could reject 
those concepts, while the most aggressive Pan-Africanists considered freedom as a 
means to eliminate all special ties to the West, and at the same time appeared quite will-
ing to follow communist models and establish close relations with the Soviet bloc. This 
was exactly what concerned the American intelligence services, as communist influence 
in the continent was reported to have grown substantially in the last two years, through 
diplomatic missions, arms aid, and economic assistance. According to the report, Mos-
cow regarded Africa as a particularly vulnerable area and felt it was possible to alienate 
it from the West. As concerned the Southern part of the continent, the Bloc could ex-
ploit a good ability to identify itself with African socialists ready to governmental direc-
18 See R. HYAM - P. HENSHAW, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War, 
Cambridge-New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 311. 
19 See National Intelligence Estimate: The Outlook for the Union of South Africa, July 19, 1960, Secret, in 
www.foia.cia.gov. 
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tion of the economy.20 This strategy in a way signalled a return to the Leninist idea of 
separate revolutionary paths, supporting anti-colonial nationalist movements, which Sta-
lin had neglected as part of the capitalist world, on the assumption that they might in 
time develop into socialist revolutions. On one hand, the General Secretary proclaimed 
that Moscow had to support national liberation wars. On the other hand, national libera-
tion struggles could easily become local wars, then escalating to general war. This was a 
powerful warning for caution in the use of violence.21
     Since the very beginning of the war, the Angolan question was reproducing locally 
the global confrontation between the two superpowers. In fact, while the UPA openly 
rejected Marxism, the MPLA, led by Agostinho Neto, regarded socialism as the only 
way to get independence.
  
22 Kennedy had met Roberto for the first time in 1959, who 
also impressed other officials like Robert Kennedy, Dean Rusk and Adlai Stevenson. He 
won financial support on grounds of his assurances that his political party was an anti-
communist movement threatened by communist-oriented factions in Angola. In 1961, 
he began receiving an annual retainer, channelled through the CIA station in Leopold-
ville, in the former Belgian Congo.23 So serious was the situation, that the two main co-
lonial powers issued tripartite talks with the United States. Salazar’s stubbornness was 
absolutely worrying for the Western governments, so much so that they were afraid of 
grave consequences in case the Portuguese should lose control in Angola, since other 
African States could be tempted to intervene, thus opening opportunities for the Soviet 
bloc. In light of all this, reforms were thought to be necessary, but first of all the three 
allies agreed that Lisbon was supposed to issue a statement of intention on the right of 
self-determination, in order to have a good effect on African public opinion.24
                                                 
20 See National Intelligence Estimate: The Probable Interrelationships of the Independent African States, 
August 31, 1961, NIE 60/70-2-61, Secret, in www.foia.cia.gov. 
  
21 See F. ERMARTH, The Soviet Union in the Third World: Purpose in Search of Power, April 1969, Santa 
Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, in www.dtic.mil. 
22 See F. SALVATORE, Gli Stati Uniti e il continente africano negli anni Sessanta. Dal terzomondismo di 
John F. Kennedy al “Keeping Africa off the Agenda” di Lyndon B. Johnson (1961-1968), in A. DONNO-
G. IURLANO, eds., L’amministrazione Nixon e il continente africano: tra decolonizzazione e guerra fredda 
(1969-1974), Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2016, p. 28.   
23 See W.W. SCHNEIDMAN, Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal’s Colonial Empire, 
Lanham, MD, University Press of America, Inc., 2004, p. 25.  
24 See Tripartite Talks on Portuguese Africa, May 4, 1961, in THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (thereafter TNA), 




     Social and economic reforms were not enough without some change in the political 
outlook, though no-one in the Western capitals really believed that Portugal’s colonial 
policies could be modified without a change in government. Concerning this point, the 
Americans showed themselves convinced there was no military solution to the problem 
of Angola, which could be sorted out only through the injection by the Portuguese of 
some new element.25 However, it seemed there was nothing to do in front of the Portu-
guese government saying they were ready to sink or swim with their African posses-
sions.26 In order to realise how awkward the Atlantic powers’ position was, we just have 
to quote what African leaders communicated in those same days. Despite the wave of 
nationalism in the continent, President Nkrumah wrote to Prime Minister Macmillan 
that Portugal was resorting to genocide to stop the march of time. In light of this, the old 
nations of the world were asked to come to terms with Africa, which could no longer be 
subject to such an outdated domination by the weakest and most decadent State in 
Europe, as Portugal was defined.27
     How sensitive the question of Angola was is shown in a speech addressed by the 
Ghanaian President to the national assembly of his own country. The avalanche of na-
tionalist fervour crossing Africa had by then touched Angola, and talking about Euro-
Africa was nonsense. Instead, it was Portugal which depended on her colonies, since 
twenty-three per cent of her total export went to her African colonies within a system 
excluding other competitors.
  
28 On the other hand, having to deal with Commonwealth 
relations the British Prime Minister clarified that his government’s aim was to help de-
pendent territories advance as rapidly as possible towards full nationhood, while at the 
same time pressing the Portuguese to follow the same course.29
                                                 
25 See Tripartite Talks in Oslo: Portuguese Africa, 9 May 1961, in TNA, FO 371/155445, JP 1023/10, Se-
cret.     
   
26 See Record of Conversation between Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, and M. Couve de Murville 
after Dinner, May 7, 1961, in TNA, FO 371/155445, JP 1023/8, Confidential. 
27 See Inward Telegram No. 692 to Commonwealth Relations Office from Accra: Angola, May 26, 1961, 
in TNA, DO 195/182, 242/34/3, Cypher, Priority, Confidential.  
28 See Angola: An Address to the Ghana National Assembly by President Kwane Nkrumah on May 30th, 
1961, in «Ghana Today», June 7, 1961.   
29 See Message to O. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah from Mr. Harold Macmillan, June 30, 1961, in DO 195/182, 
242/34/3, Secret. 
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     Such a posture was becoming a font of criticism among Afro-Asian States for not 
being able to adopt repressive measures against the Lusitanian country.30 As an evi-
dence of this, we can quote a seminar of Portuguese colonies held in New Delhi on Oc-
tober 23, 1961, during which Afro-Asian delegates discussed several measures to bring 
Lisbon’s colonialism to a speedy end, from United Nations intervention to force Portu-
gal to grant independence to her colonies, to material support to liberation movements 
by breaking off diplomatic and trade relations with the Salazar regime31
     At the same time, the third All-African Peoples’ Conference in Cairo in the previous 
March had given a definition of “neo-colonialism”, describing it as the survival of the 
old colonial system in emerging independent countries, which had become victim of an 
indirect form of domination by political, economic, and technological means. According 
to Soviet specialists, neo-colonialism in Africa was being implemented through the set-
ting up of NATO military bases and the recognition of puppet regimes, or by driving 
newly independent countries into political or economic associations, such as the French 
Community or the Commonwealth itself. Having said this, the Soviet authorities were 
making any effort to persuade African leaders that the continent would have no future 
unless severing all links with the capitalist system. The only major voice of dissent to-
wards such an anti-Western tide was the so-called Brazzaville Group, including both 
Marxist and non-Marxist advocates of African socialism, who did not necessarily reject 




     The point was that in 1951 Portugal and the United States had signed a defence 
agreement, providing Washington with base rights in the Azores for a five year period, 
both in peacetime and in wartime. The Azores were of paramount importance for the 
Americans, as in that period around seventy-five per cent of all U.S. military air traffic 
  
                                                 
30 See Inward Telegram No. 4741 from Foreign Office to Washington: Angola, July 12, 1961, in TNA, FO 
371/155446, Cypher and By Bag, Confidential.  
31 See Delegates from Portuguese Colonies Appeal for Help, October 23, 1961, in «Indiagram», Press 
Release No. 103, Information Service of India, London.   
32 “The Theory of ‘Neo-Colonialism’ as Developed in the Soviet Union and in Africa”: FO Research Dept 
Paper, 28 November 1961, CO 1027/405, no. 9, in R. HYAM – WM R. LOUIS, eds., British Documents on 
the End of Empire, series A, vol. 4, The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, part II, Eco-
nomics, International Relations, and the Commonwealth, London, The Stationary Office, 2000, doc. n. 




to Europe and the Middle East stopped over in that base. Therefore, while President 
Kennedy was not willing to have his African policy held hostage to such an old-
fashioned version of colonialism, at the same time the Administration believed there 
was a serious risk for the United States to be denied access to the facility. Throughout 
his mandate, Kennedy was always tilting between Africanists and Europeanists within 
the Administration, but the State Department aimed at dispersing exaggerated suspi-
cions on American involvement with Angolan dissidents.33
     To tell the truth, the CIA staff were thinking of more persuading strategies towards 
Lisbon, in order to make the Portuguese accept a sort a “Commonwealth Plan” to grant 
self-determination in Africa. The programme, as arranged by Paul Sakwa, was based on 
the assumption that the Latin country was not economically and military strong enough 
to face the guerrilla in Africa. Therefore, the only thing to do was unfolding a plan to 
grant self-determination to Angola and Mozambique within eight years, with a conse-
quent referendum to let the colonies decide which kind of relationship to maintain with 
the mother country. Sakwa himself, however, was sure that Salazar would never accept 
such a plan.
   
34
     Apart from this, the Pentagon and the Secretary of Defence, Robert S. McNamara, 
were concerned about anything able to jeopardise American military interests in Africa, 
as any action undertaken by the U.S. would likely alienate in some degree either Portu-
gal, or South Africa. Therefore, it was pivotal for the Americans to avoid any initiative 
prejudicing the relations with either side in such a dispute.
  
35
                                                 
33 See SCHNEIDMAN, Engaging Africa, cit., pp. 30-33. 
 Such a realistic policy be-
came even more important for the Atlantic powers if we read what the British Ambas-
sador wrote after being back from Angola in November 1962. Speaking about the white 
settler population, in fact, the diplomat said the Europeans were passionately attached 
both to the land where they lived, and to the idea of Portugal as their permanent mother 
country, unless the Lisbon Government proved themselves not able either to eliminate 
34 See ibid., pp. 46-47. 
35 See Letter from Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, July 11, 
1963, in K. MOKOENA, ed., South Africa and the United States: The Declassified History, The National 
Security Archive, New York, NY, The New Press, 1993, doc. n. 4, pp. 62-63. 
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the pan-African threat, or to come to terms with it before Portugal as a whole got ex-
hausted.36
     To this we may add that according to the Foreign Office the Africans were bound to 
find communism as an attractive theory to their problems, especially because of its abil-
ity to put the blame for anything wrong on past colonialism or current imperialism. 
However, the Soviets were not the only ones interested in the destabilisation of the Af-
rican continent. In the 1960s, in fact, the Chinese were showing a certain tendency to 
exploit opposition groups in areas of potential violence, though their influence was on a 
much smaller scale that that of Moscow. Apart from this, the British were concerned 
about the communist bloc’s ability to capture the allegiance of the younger generations 
of African leaders and scholars.
  
37
     As we can see, Portugal and the Atlantic powers had something in common, which 
in the end overcame the difference on colonialism. The need to keep communism away 
from Africa did not allow Western democracies to really struggle to end racial discrimi-
nations. Moreover, Angola looked like the perfect Cold War theatre, with different na-
tionalist movements based also on different ethnic groups. In particular, in the early 
1960s the MPLA, which had been founded in Luanda, drew its main support from the 
Mbundu, the country’s second largest ethnic group, and also attracted some mestiço in-
tellectuals. Instead, the UPA was mainly supported by the Bakongo population in the 
extreme North-West of the country. Being the third largest group in Angola, the Ba-




                                                 
36 Sir Archibald Ross to Lord Home: Sir Archibald Ross’ Visit to Portuguese Africa, November 23, 1962, 
Section 1, in TNA, FO 371/161641, JP 1631/15, Confidential. 
 UPA activities in the former Belgian colony were also a way for the United 
States to better support Roberto, as in 1963 the White House had implemented a mili-
tary aid mission in Leopoldville, soon to be re-called Kinshasa, with the aim of training 
the military to reach the necessary ability to grant national security. That year in May, 
the strong man of Zaire and advocate of any opposition to communism, Joseph-Désiré 
Mobutu, being the Commander in Chief of the Army had visited the White House, 
37 See “Countering Communism in Africa”: FO Circular Despatch (No. 101, by C.F.R. Barclay) to Brit-
ish Representatives in Africa, November 9, 1962, CO 1027/382, in HYAM - LOUIS, eds., British Docu-
ments, cit., doc. n. 387, pp. 262-264. 




while the CIA officer in the Congo, Lawrence Devlin, was already thinking of a coup to 
let then Mobutu run a military government. The Americans wanted to turn Zaire into a 
stronghold against the growing Soviet influence in Africa and were persuaded that only 
a strong leader would be able to keep all ethnic groups of the country together. Finally, 
within Washington’s political circles the “African Domino Theory” was being given 
credit. According to this postulate, if the United States had abandoned the Congo, 
probably the Soviets would have filled the vacuum, then other African States would 
have negatively perceived any identification with the West.39
     In the meantime, on April 3, 1962, Roberto had established the Govêrno 
Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE), with the aim of seeking early recognition. 
Among the principles of GRAE there was an appeal to African unity in order to make the 
battle for independence anywhere in Africa the struggle of the whole continent.
                
40 On the 
other had, the MPLA complained about the existence in Angola of a capitalist sector 
dominated by the colonists and foreign capital and monopolies. Instead, the African sec-
tor was poor, pre-capitalists and deprived of all means of growth. Since peasants formed 
the most exploited and largest social class in Angola, the MPLA had to make sure that 
they were sufficiently represented in the groups waging the battle within the country. 
Eventual negotiations with the Portuguese government were supposed to be based on 
certain minimal conditions, such as recognition of the right of Angola to self-
determination and then independence, withdrawal of all armed forces, and safeguarding 
of territorial unity and integrity. As regarded foreign policy, Neto claimed a posture of 
positive neutrality as the only possible orientation in a world full of threats.41 From Rus-
sian sources, however, we know that Mario de Andrade had flown to the Soviet Union 
in 1958 and then 1960. In the latter occasion he spoke about the contradictions with 
Roberto’s UPA, calling it a «[…] racist organisation and due to its ties with the USA, a 
reactionary one».42
                                                 
39 See L.A. NITCHER, Compagni di Guerra Fredda: Richard Nixon e Mobutu Sese Seko, in DONNO -  IUR-
LANO, eds., L’amministrazione Nixon e il continente africano, cit., pp. 158-159.    
 Finally, the experience of Chinese communists and Maoist ideology 
were at the core of national liberation patterns. In fact, by advocating revolution every-
40 See The GRAE Declaration of Principles, in CHILCOTE, Emerging Nationalism, cit., pp. 109-111. 
41 See First National Conference of the MPLA, Léopoldville, December 1962, ibid., pp. 251-265. 
42 V. SHUBIN, The Hot ”Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa, London, Pluto Press, 2008, p. 8. 
Realpolitik and African Nationalism 
625 
where, and not only in industrialised societies, Maoism seemed fitter for the Third 
World.43
     The Marxist doctrine added economic independence to self-determination, and what 
had to be confronted, Maoism introduced, was the double-edged sword of imperialism. 
Hence, in its anti-colonial war the MPLA looked at the experience of other revolutionary 
movements, like those fighting in Angola and in Vietnam.
  
44 During his following visit 
to the Soviet capital, in July 1962, de Andrade was concerned about the Congolese gov-
ernment putting several obstacles to MPLA activities, as well as UPA’S efforts to absorb 
the MPLA into the National front for the Liberation of Angola.45 Moreover, by reading a 
few interviews we find out that in those times MPLA militants saw the United States as 
their main enemy, though Western Germany, giving weapons to Lisbon, and France, 
creating political difficulties for the liberation movements, were supporting Portugal a 
lot.46
     When the struggle for independence began, Angola’s economic and social structure 
was typically colonial, as manufacturing industry accounted for only 13 per cent of 
GDP. Agricultural production, the extractive industry, and international trade were the 
most important GDP contributors. The main exported good was coffee, together with 
other unprocessed agricultural goods (sisal, maize, sugar, cotton, and wood). Mined 
goods, such as diamonds and iron, contributed another 17 and 4 per cent, respectively. 
Portugal was Angola’s principal supplier, followed by Great Britain and the U.S., while 
the latter was Angola’s main export client. The Benguela railway line was the main traf-
fic link for mineral wealth of Katanga, in South Congo, and Northern Rhodesia, soon to 
  
                                                 
43A few years later Downing Street issued a memorandum on communist activities in Africa, stressing 
that the subversive effort, which in the past had been mainly guided by metropolitan communist powers 
of former colonial powers, was being given new strength through direct Soviet bloc or Chinese interven-
tion and establishment of diplomatic relations with newly independent States. All this with the aim of 
gaining influence. The new way to pursue such a target was based on a flexible pattern of steady erosion, 
according to which adjustments could be made, from encouragement of revolution to favour local com-
munist fractions, to State-to-State relations between communist powers and black independent countries. 
See “Communist Subversion in Africa”: British Memorandum (from Sir A. Douglas-Home, T 161/64) for 
the Prime Minister of Nigeria, April 23, 1964, PREM 11/4609, in HYAM - LOUIS, eds., British Documents, 
cit., doc. n. 390, pp. 273-277.       
44See S.N. YADAV - I. BAGHEL, Nationalism in Portuguese Africa, New Delhi, Jnanada Prakashan, 2010, 
pp. 156-157.  
45See SHUBIN, The Hot “Cold War”, cit., p. 9.  
46 See Interview to Lúcio Lara, Luanda, 16 April 1996, in T. SELLSTRÖM, ed., Liberation in Southern Af-




become independent and called Zambia, to reach the Atlantic Ocean. To lessen interna-
tional criticism and to rally internal support in Angola and in Portugal, the colonial mas-
ters realised that reform measures to foster economic growth and development in An-
gola were urgently needed. Hence, Angola’s economy was formally integrated into the 
Portuguese Economic Area, but colonial rules had protected Portuguese manufacturing 
industry and prevented Angolan really independent industrial take-off. In brief, reforms 
were implemented to respond to the main allegation that Africans were second-class 
citizens and, apart from revoking the Statute of Natives, reform the educational system, 
recognising it as a weapon in the struggle against nationalists, assuming direct responsi-
bility of the total Angolan population. Finally, African labourers were no longer forcibly 
recruited through government officers. Instead, relying on the Africans’ constant need 
of cash income to pay taxes and buy life necessities, the administration licensed private 
recruiters to go into villages and enlist men to work in plantations, or mines, fisheries 
and so on.47 As concerned the British comment on the situation, despite everything the 
Ambassador leaving his office wrote that the Portuguese were the least race-conscious 
of all Europeans. This meant they were less hit by prejudices against coloured people. In 
consequence of this, Sir Archibald Ross said that in Angola there was no sign of racial 
legal segregation, for no white and black facilities had been institutionalised. Instead, 
the dividing factor along colour lines concerned economic and social areas. Very few 
Africans, in fact, were qualified to work in top business or government positions.48
  
2. Wilson’s Labour Britain: idealism vs realism                                                                     
         
                                            
As a confirmation to American and British uncertainties, in July 1963 Kennedy solved 
the question of the Azores through the formula of the “best of two worlds”, introducing 
a relatively moderate posture towards Portugal and a tough policy towards South Af-
rica.49
                                                 
47See YADAV - BAGHEL, Nationalism in Portuguese Africa, cit., pp. 210-212. 
 In the same period, the CIA was monitoring Nasser’s activities in Africa, trying to 
expand Egyptian influence in the continent and establish diplomatic and political ties. 
48 See Sir Archibald Ross’s Valedictory Despatch, October 28, 1963, in TNA, FO 371/167436, 1012/G, 
Confidential. 
49See Z. LAÏDI, The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry, 1960-1990, Chicago, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, IL, 1990, p. 19.  
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By claiming the role of anti-colonial champion, the President of the United Arab Repub-
lic was trying to achieve a larger role in the struggle against Portuguese and South Afri-
can governments.50 This strategy responded to the theory of the three circles introduced 
by Nasser in the late 1950s, according to which Egypt was surrounded by an Arab, an 
African, and an Islamic circle, all of them overlapping. After all, the continent in which 
Egypt is situated is Africa, and at the time of Nasser’s writing the massive decoloniza-
tion had not yet taken place. All this was confirmed by the warm welcome given in 
Cairo to GRAE representatives, while other Arab countries, like Iraq, started to officially 
recognise the Government in exile.51 The Afrikaner government of South Africa saw the 
Egyptian leader as a source of new imperialism in Africa, as well as the symbol of old 
nationalism. Hence, had Nasser been left unchallenged, this would have encouraged 
other nationalists in the continent to be more ambitious and adventurous. On the con-
trary, if the West had sought to frustrate Nasser by force, it would have turned him into 
a hero and thus fanned the fires of nationalism.52 Despite the American Administra-
tion’s opposition to racial discrimination, the main question for the White House was to 
prevent the black continent from shifting to the East.53
                                                 
50See Central Intelligence Agency Special Memorandum: Nasser’s Policy and Prospects in Black Africa, 
Office of National Estimates Special Memorandum nn. 1-64, in www.foia.cia.gov. 
 In particular, with the entry of 
the Chinese the State Department was persuaded that Red China was embarking on a 
major political offensive in Africa, making an effort to identify herself with African 
movements and increase her influence among nationalist groups by generous offers of 
assistance, including in Portuguese territories, at the same time asserting Chinese com-
munist revolutionary ideology over that of the USSR. Actually, in those days the Chinese 
were favouring the establishment of the International United Front, which also included 
European countries not associated with American policies. Chou En-Lai was careful to 
51See Monthly Summary of the Activities of the Angolan Exile Political Parties in Congo/Leopoldville: 
February 1964, March 25, 1964, in TNA, FCO 141/14056, Northern Rhodesia Government Secretariat, 
(1021/64), 58/230/01, Confidential.  
52See O. ABENGURIN, The Arabs and the Southern African Problem, in «International Affairs», LX, 1, 
Winter 1983-1984, p. 98.  
53On December 31, 1962, exactly when the Agreement on the usage of Azores expired, the Portuguese 
government had formally let Washington know that, as long as renewal negotiations were in progress, the 
American would be allowed to use the base. However, without a renewed formal and written agreement, 
they were always subject to the risk of being forced out, thus limiting their chances to put pressure on 




show an image of China as a revolutionary country, but at the same time willing to co-
operate with non-aligned States. In particular, Beijing offered the Africans a five-eight 
formula, that is five principles for Sino-African political relations and eight principles 
for economic relations. The package included: a) China as leader of the struggle against 
old and new imperialism; b) Chinese aid on the most favourable terms to establish self-
sufficient and diversified economies; c) support to African desire to observe non-
aligned policies; d) greater unity of Africa and the Asian world.54
     In order to avoid all that, it was better for Portugal at least to issue a public statement 
endorsing self-determination, thus allowing the United States to make an effort to urge 
again the Africans to participate in discussions with the Portuguese and press for change 
in Portuguese territories. Instead, by refusing to advocate such a principle, Portugal was 
not serving American interests.
 
55 In a few words, in order not to lose the area to Soviet 
and Chinese manoeuvres the State Department was practically in favour of supporting 
the nationalist movement in Angola, thus preventing the communist powers to plunge 
in. In brief, there was no alternative to covert activities and secret funding to GRAE 
leaders, in addition to Roberto. Withdrawal of subsidies could mean abandonment of 
any guidance or influence in the nationalist movement.56 The Johnson Administration 
believed that failure to respond to self-determination aspirations of Portuguese Africans 
would result in changes detrimental to the interests of the United States as well as to 
Portugal.57
                                                 
54See T.Y. ISMAEL, The People’s Republic of China and Africa, in «The Journal of Modern African Stud-
ies», IX, 4, December 1971, pp. 512-513.   
 This was completely useless, as Salazar remained adamantly opposed to any 
public statement on self-determination, adding that nationalist pressures were from out-
side Angola and Mozambique, but they would promptly develop internally if Portugal 
were to make public utterance on self-determination. He also claimed stability offered 
by Portuguese administration in Africa with that offered by newly-independent African 
55See Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal, January 17, 1964 in NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (thereafter NARA), College Park, MD, Record Group 59 
(thereafter RG 59), Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN, Confidential. 
56See Memorandum from the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(Scott) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams): Minutes of Meeting of the Special 
Group of 12 March 1964, March 16, 1964, in NARA, RG 59, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, 
S.G. 114, Secret, Eyes Only. 
57See Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal, April 16, 1964, in NARA, RG 
59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT, Confidential, Priority. 
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States. Finally, he made clear and explicit his belief that American efforts were misdi-
rected and could only lead to instability and retrogression.58
     In the meantime, however, the nationalists were becoming increasingly radical, ad-
mitting pro-Communist elements into the organizations. Hence, the most immediate 
problem for Washington was trying to prevent the nationalists from mortgaging their 
future to the Communists and from reaching a stage where they would no longer be dis-
posed to negotiate a moderate and evolutionary settlement. United States long-term in-
terests in the area required that a new approach be made to unblock the stalemate and 
thus prevent the future situation from being gravely jeopardized, at the same time per-
mitting Portuguese presence to remain in some form. The State Department believed 
clandestine assistance was necessary, aiming at setting up an extensive political organi-
zation within and outside the territories. This organization was to be based on non-racial 
principles and obtain the adherence of as many elements as possible of the populations 
concerned, in order to set in motion forces favourable to the cause of self-determination 
and capable of bringing pressures to bear on Portugal to change her policies.
  
59
     As a matter of fact, in the 1960s the Cold War confrontation was generating a battle 
of ideas in Southern Africa on the appropriate path to progress and modernity. In this 
part of the continent, socialism appeared to provide the road to true liberation through 
the transformation of the national economy. By transcending ethnic rivalries, it seemed 
it could give a solution to the flawed economic legacy of colonialism and providing an 
ideological vehicle for the transformation of land ownership.
 
60
                                                 
58See Telegram from the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State, April 18, 1964, in NARA, RG 
59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT, Confidential. 
 The U.S. Administration 
was first of all interested in fighting the presumed communist threat, above all in the 
Congo. Pronouncements on self-determination were tempered by concerns about the 
risk for independence to offer new opportunities for Moscow. In light of this, Portu-
guese colonialism was seen as a threat to national interests only as it might provoke 
59See Action Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secre-
tary of State Rusk: Portuguese African Territories, April 29, 1964, in D.S. PATTERSON, gen. ed. - N.D. 
HOWLAND, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, (thereafter FRUS), vol. XXIV, Africa, 
Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1999, doc. n. 418, Secret, Special Handling, 
in www.state.gov. 
60See S. ONSLOW, The Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Nationalism and External Inter-
vention, in S. ONSLOW, ed., Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, Abingdon- 




radical revolutions.61 In a word, it was in the United States’ interest not to abandon the 
more moderate nationalist movements in the face of Soviet and Chinese competition. 
On the other hand, the Portuguese authorities continued receiving reports of large ship-
ments of arms coming from a variety of communist countries and entering the Congo 
for the use of Holden Roberto, thus showing concern on the use of Congolese territory 
as a safe haven in launching attacks against Angola. By reading documents, we can eas-
ily see how different from the reality the Portuguese portrait of Angola was. According 
to Lisbon, in fact, Angola was a sort of island of peace and contentment in a sea of Afri-
can turmoil, and the whole population was enjoying social, economic, and health bene-
fits, while racial integration was complete. The only threat was personified by the non-
nationalist, communist-backed rebel movement.62
     Keeping overseas provinces was also considered as a way for Portugal to express her 
personality. According to British analyses, Portugal had not shared the major colonial 
powers’ liberal background, which had led them to feel a sense of guilt for the past and 
develop the “wind of change policy”. Being isolated from political democracy, the Lusi-
tanians had kept their colonial tradition largely intact. The British report from Luanda, 
we have to observe, was not so optimistic about the future of nationalist movements, 
regarded as divided along tribal lines and backed by other African governments and the 
Afro-Asian Bloc in the United Nations. The latter, in particular, was thought to have 
ability to blackmail the West, though the most responsible members seemed to recog-
nise the implications of tribal divisions and the impossibility of immediate self-
determination. On the contrary, independence was seen as a kind of backward step, as 
African predominance could result in tribal anarchy, while European Angolans would 
try to resist African domination under such conditions and press for a greater share of 
autonomy from the mother country on a Southern Rhodesian model. However it was, in 
the mid 1960s Angola was starting to develop quite a respectable economy, as oil had 
been found off the enclave of Cabinda and in the vicinity of Luanda, while diamonds 
  
                                                 
61See W. MINTER, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, 
London-New Jersey, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg-Zed Books, 1994, p. 143. 
62See Memorandum of Conversation: Portuguese Ambassador's Call on the Secretary, June 30, 1964, in 
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were the second most valuable export.63 This new situation gave Portugal, in case of 
sanctions against South Africa, the chance to export oil towards the Afrikaner 
neighbouring government, as it was difficult for the United Nations to impose a sort of 
blockade on the high seas against tankers.64
     On grounds of archive documentation, we can say the two Atlantic powers shared a 
very similar assessment of the situation in Africa, agreeing that Soviet penetration of the 
continent was a serious threat. As concerned Southern Africa in particular, an attractive 
package of proposals had to be prospected to countries bordering with the area, in order 
to persuade them to approach the problem in a more moderate mood.
  
65 Overall, we can 
say that U.S. interests in the area could be summed up in three categories: a) mutual nu-
clear deterrence between Washington and Moscow; b) sea-routes protection; c) political 
and military influence in the area.66 At the same time, despite ongoing modest support 
for Holden Roberto, Washington was becoming more reluctant to back UN resolutions 
critical of Portugal and the CIA even attempted to appease Salazar with bomber aircrafts 
to be used in colonial wars.67
                                                 
63See Mr. Stewart to Sir Archibald Ross (Lisbon): First Impressions of Angola, JP 1013/14; Sir Archibald 
Ross to Mr. R.A. Butler: Comments on Her Majesty’s Consul-General’s First Impressions of Angola, JP 
1013/12, Portuguese Africa, Section 1, May 21, 1964, in TNA FO 371/176932, Confidential.   
 By establishing direct military ties with France and West 
Germany, CIA analysts wrote, Salazar had shown that he was not totally dependent on 
the U.S. in that field, and he had also broken the political isolation of his country from 
the rest of Europe. In light of that, efforts to move the dictator towards public accep-
tance of even the principle of self-determination were becoming more and more diffi-
cult. Moreover, short of a colonial disaster, which at the moment did not appear likely, 
there was little chance for Portuguese opposition to oust the leader and change some-
thing. Even in that case, the CIA predicted that any successor regime would be deter-
mined to retain Angola and Mozambique as much as Salazar, who believed that “Afri-
64 See Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee: Working Party on Sanctions against 
South Africa – Oil Supplies from Angola: Note by the Secretaries, 6 July 1964, in TNA, CAB 148/11, D.O. 
(O) (S.A.) (64) 10, Confidential.  
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can nation” was another name for chaos.68 In addition, there were also economic rea-
sons why Portugal wanted to retain her African colonies, as Angola was an important 
source of foreign exchange and provided protected markets and investment opportuni-
ties. Roberto’s policies and long range intentions were believed to be uncertain by 
Washington’s experts, and in Africa he was regarded as a leader willing to keep ties 
with the West.69 The outlook for Portugal looked positive also because the GRAE army 
was showing its increasing ineffectiveness, racked by mutinies and deserted by many, as 
well as largely cut off from its own forces inside Angola where nationalist activity had 
virtually ceased. Therefore, American diplomats on the spot believed the decline of 
GRAE could be very unhappy for the West, as the most likely alternative leadership to 
Roberto was the pro-Chinese Viriato da Cruz.70
                                                 
68See Central Intelligence Agency: Special Memorandum No. 9-64 - Salazar’s Current Prospects, June 8, 
1964, Secret, in www.foia.gov. 
 On the other hand, the kind of socialism 
as defined by the MPLA had little in common with African socialism, as – quoting what 
Agostinho Neto used to say – it didn’t only aim at getting rid of former colonial socie-
ties to turn into egalitarian and independent nations, but it also wanted to hand over the 
means of production to those who produced, thus insuring the just distribution of goods. 
According to this classical scientific interpretation of socialism, focusing on the unique-
ness of the African personality produced the effect of ignoring the real problem to radi-
cally transform the society of the continent. In the Angolan socialist view, the intransi-
gence of Portuguese colonialism had precluded a more evolutionary approach to inde-
pendence, such as in the former British and French colonies. Rather, it had dictated the 
adoption of a more revolutionary doctrine of socialism with the task of eradicating any 
vestige of the old regime. Hence, the reconstruction of a country implied much more 
than its simple economic reorganisation. Having said this, the most important influence 
on Angolan socialism was certainly the revolutionary thought of Amílcar Cabral from 
Cape Verde, who argued that although classes did exist in colonial Africa, they were of 
marginal importance to the dynamic of colonialism, which was instead the clash be-
69See Special National Intelligence Estimate: Short-Term Prospects for the African Nationalist Movement 
in Angola and Mozambique, July 1, 1964, SNIE 71-64, Secret, Controlled Dissem., in www.foia.gov. 
70See Information Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs (O’Sullivan) to 
the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams): Deterioration of the Angolan Liberation 
Movement, November 2, 1964, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files, POL 30–2 ANG, Secret. 
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tween European and African cultures.71 According to Cabral, cultural oppression under 
the guise of a policy assimilation was the cutting edge of colonialism, rather than politi-
cal and economic oppression. Therefore, it was not class, but cultural interest and identi-
fication that had to serve as the rallying point of resistance. By asserting their being Af-
rican, the people took their first step towards the organisation of an armed struggle.72 In 
1964, the Soviets embraced Dr. Neto as a more credible nationalist, though a couple of 
years previously he had been to Washington to argue the issue of Angola’s independ-
ence, saying that is was wrong to call the MPLA a communist movement. Although he 
proclaimed himself a Marxist, in fact, Neto felt more nationalist and was ready to accept 
help from anywhere, including the West.73
     As concerned the British, we can say the new Labour Government’s primary aim 
towards Portugal was threefold. First of all, keeping Portugal firmly within the Western 
alliance, as a member of NATO and as a power with possessions in Africa, was pivotally 
important. London wished to maintain facilities not only in continental Portugal, but 
also in the Azores and possibly in Southern Africa. Secondly, it was desirable to keep, 
and possibly expand, the British share in Portuguese markets and investments. Finally, 
there was the desire to maintain Lisbon’s interest and co-operation with EFTA. This 
stance became even more urgent in view of the fact that France was establishing power-
ful assets in Portugal.
                    
74 For the British, moreover, taking into account some Common-
wealth leaders’ posture had become of paramount importance. In particular, it seemed 
that the President of Tanzania had given approval for the liberation struggle to be waged 
from Tanzanian soil, once that turmoil had been spread to Mozambique as well.75
                                                 
71The MPLA did not consider Africa as the centre stage of its foreign relations, nor did it warm to the ac-
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President of Angola, made his first appearance in an OAU summit. See O. OGUNBADEJO, Angola: Ideol-
ogy and Pragmatism in Foreign Policy, in «International Affairs», LVII, 2, Spring 1981, p. 260.     
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72See K. BROWN, Angolan Socialism, in C.G. ROSBERG - T.M. CALLAGHY, eds., Socialism in Sub-Saharan 
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75The outline of what became Tanzanian foreign policy had been formulated by the Tanganyka African 
National Union since 1960 and could be summarised as: a) socialism and progressive reforms on the na-




Portuguese determination to resist in her African possessions had actually developed 
Nyerere’s opinion that the NATO alliance was at least providing moral support.76 Con-
cerning this, the President of Tanzania wrote to Harold Wilson, who had been appointed 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in October 1964, that the question of the Portu-
guese territories had by then become the most dangerous situation, but also the one in 
which some new approach was likely to be fruitful. The real danger was that nationalists 
were by then ready to accept weapons from anyone, including of course communist 
countries. In that case, the West could decide to assist Portugal against communism, 
thus making the conflict escalate in a process seeing Africa and the West bitterly hostile 
to each other. Nyerere’s position on this issue was clear: the Portuguese colonies had to 
be set free, possibly in a peaceful way. However, if this was not possible, Africa as a 
whole had to join the struggle by whatever means necessary. This optimistic stance was 
also due to the fact that Portugal could not cope with heavy military expenditures over a 
long span of time. Therefore, the Tanzanian leader suggested that the major Western 
Powers persuade Portugal to accept the United Nations or the Organisation of African 
Unity as Trusteeship Authority for her colonies, with a timetable for independence.77 
The harsh fact, however, was that as long as Salazar was in power everybody knew 
there was no chance for the Portuguese to realise that their time in Africa could not last 
long. It was also true, Wilson replied to Nyerere, that quick independence could lead to 
complete chaos, due to the inexperience of African ruling classes.78 Moreover, Britain’s 
position was made more difficult by Portuguese complaints about the will not to be at-
tacked in the United Nations or in any other organisation by allies supporting false and 
irresponsible charges in favour of the Afro-Asian bloc.79
     The cessation of violence was also of paramount importance for the Johnson Ad-
ministration to reach agreement for a peaceful resolution and start a process of self-
determination, thus keeping the Soviets away from the area. The Americans proposed 
  
                                                                                                                                               
tions, on the global stage. See P. BJERK, Postcolonial Realism: Tanganyika’s Foreign Policy under Nyer-
ere, 1960-1963, in «The International Journal of African Historical Studies», XLIV, 2, 2011, p. 219.  
76See Telegram No. 54 from Dar Es Salaam to Commonwealth Relations Office, January 11, 1965, Cy-
pher/OTP, in DO 213/27/35/707/14, Immediate, Confidential.  
77 See Letter from J.K. Nyerere to H. Wilson, April 10, 1965, in TNA, DO 213/27, 35/707/14, (2) EP, 
13/45/1, Secret.    
78 See Letter from H. Wilson to J.K. Nyerere, June 1, 1965, in TNA, DO 213/27, 35/707/14, Secret.    
79See Despatch to Sir A. Ross, Lisbon, undated, in TNA, DO 213/27, 35/707/14, Confidential.     
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an eight-year transition period leading to free and open plebiscite observed by UN and 
OAU representatives. In return, neighbouring African states were supposed to pledge 
assurances not to allow subversive elements to organize or operate from their territories 
against Portuguese territories, as well as not allowing to flow across their territories to 
such elements. During the transition period, the United States could provide and en-
courage other NATO allies to provide economic and technical support for Portuguese 
efforts to develop African territories.80 Such a proposal was based on the estimate that, 
since the Portuguese were in a relatively strong position in both Angola and Mozam-
bique, it was thought there was an opportunity for Portugal and the Africans to reach 
agreement for a peaceful resolution. In case of violation of the accords, the United 
States was considered as responsive to requests for arms purchases, whether from Por-
tugal or from the African side.81 Actually, we also have to say that U.S. Ambassadors in 
Portugal in those years were all espousing the Portuguese point of view. As an evidence 
of that, Admiral George W. Anderson, appointed by Kennedy and still serving in the 
days at issue, had visited Angola and Mozambique the previous year, stating that he had 
been impressed by the Portuguese civilising presence in Africa.82
                                                 
80See Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal, June 9, 1965, in NARA, RG 59, 
Central Files 1964-66, POL 10, PORT, Secret. 
 All this was taking 
place while Southern Rhodesia unilaterally proclaimed independence from Britain, on 
November 11, 1965. From a Portuguese point of view this was reason for relief, as 
President Kaunda of Zambia had to face a lot of problems arising from the Rhodesian 
question and for a considerable span of time the Americans thought he would be able to 
allow the Angolans to establish a base in his country, since he had to keep open the 
chance to use the Benguela railway through Angola, in case the traffic through Rhodesia 
were cut off. What leaves us impressed, however, is that the Central Intelligence 
Agency reported that there was no evidence the communist powers were ready to inter-
vene in such a critical area. Ironically, it was the rivalry among Africans that prevented 
most communist efforts from being successful, beside problems of great distance and 
81See Circular Airgram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal: Instructions to Lisbon 
to: (1) Reply to Foreign Minister’s Complaints of U.S. Policy; (2) Reaffirm U.S. Interest in Azores Base 
and Loran-C Negotiations; (3) Introduce New U.S. Proposal for a Peaceful Resolution of the Portuguese 
African Question, August 23, 1965, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files, POL PORT-US, CA-2167, Secret. 




logistics. A break in the game was thought to be possible only after Salazar’s death.83 
Such positions were made easier thanks to the American policy makers’ mentality, who 
until the collapse of Portuguese rule in Africa used to divide the continent into black 
Africa and white-dominated Africa, without clearly perceiving the link between policies 
towards Southern Africa and their repercussions on black independent countries.84 As 
concerned the Russians, it was also true that they aimed at being politically involved in 
the continent, namely seeking friends and allies, and consequently undermining the 
links between not only Africans and the West, but also those with China. Communist 
leaders tended to see the world by classifying countries according to the nature of their 
ruling class and the relative progress along the path of socialism, as well as their attitude 
towards capitalism.85 Actually, the Sino-Soviet split worked in favour not only of revo-
lutionary movements, but also of more conventional nationalist groups, thus undermin-
ing African unity, especially in Angola.86
     At the beginning of 1966, it seemed the general outlook in Southern Africa was fa-
vouring the Portuguese. From an economic point of view, in fact, American interests 
were growing due to Gulf Oil investments drilling black gold in Cabinda.
  
87
                                                 
83 See Office of National Estimates: Central Intelligence Agency Special Memorandum No. 28-65: A New 
Look at the Prospects for the African Nationalist Movements in Angola and Mozambique, November 17, 
1965, Secret, in www.foia.cia.gov. 
 As regarded 
external support to nationalists, although it was impossible for Kinshasa to openly sup-
press GRAE, the government of Zaire was imposing restrictions seriously impeding the 
activity of Angolan nationalists. Much more important for Lisbon, however, was the 
rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, since the survival of a white-dominated regime in 
Salisbury was thought to be of paramount importance for the white minority in Angola 
too, though it was not profitable at all to harm relations with neighbouring Zambia. 
Moreover, in those days a series of coups d’état had taken place in several West African 
countries, thus preventing them to focus their attention on geographically distant is-
84See H. BIENEN, U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Africa, in «Political Science Quarterly», XCIII, 3, 
Autumn 1978, p. 448. 
85See R.D. GREY, The Soviet Presence in Africa: An Analysis of Goals, in «The Journal of Modern Afri-
can Studies», XXII, 3, September 1984, pp. 513-514.   
86See T.H. HENRIKSEN, People’s War in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, in «The Journal of 
Modern African Studies», XIV, 3, September 1976, p. 390. 
87See W.J. FOLTZ, United States Policy toward Southern Africa: Economic and Strategic Constraints, in 
«Political Science Quarterly», XCII, 1, Spring 1977, p. 62. 
Realpolitik and African Nationalism 
637 
sues.88 Nevertheless, the Portuguese acquired anxiety over the security of the Eastern 
frontier with Zambia, due exactly to the particularly sensitive Rhodesian crisis, which 
might convince Dr. Kaunda to allow Angolan rebels to establish bases on Zambian terri-
tory.89 By reading records, we can easily realise how interested Britain was in keeping 
stability in the area. The breakout of a real revolution was something to absolutely 
avoid, as the largest British investments in Africa were in Nigeria, Ghana and Zambia. 
Therefore, Britain had become vulnerable if action had been taken against these invest-
ments – dealing particularly with raw material industries – in one of the afore mentioned 
countries. Apart from this, Commonwealth African States, such as Zambia, had gross 
sterling holdings.90 In addition, London took almost twenty per cent of Zambian ex-
ports, as well as the same percentage of her copper. The other main export from Zambia 
was tobacco, though it could be easily replaced by non-African supplies.91
 
    
3. The Last Days of Salazar 
On March 13, 1966, Jonas Savimbi and Antonio da Costa Fernandes founded the União 
Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), eventually gaining an exile 
base in Zambia. Savimbi had been originally affiliated with Roberto as GRAE Foreign 
Minister, but later he moved his followers to the South-East of the country, heavily 
drawing UNITA leadership from Angola's majority Ovimbumbu ethnic group and its 
policies were originally Maoist, maybe influenced by Savimbi's early training in China. 
They aimed at rural rights and recognized ethnic divisions. Savimbi also knew his way 
around the diplomatic circuit, having been a student in Portugal as well as in Switzer-
land.92
                                                 
88 See Luanda Despatch No. 2 to Lisbon, January 17, 1966, in TNA, DO 213/76, Internal Affairs in An-
gola: Political and Military, 2-EA56/129/2, 1012, Confidential.  
 What he blamed to Roberto was the confusion among the ranks of nationalists in 
89See Luanda Despatch No. 4 to Lisbon, April 13, 1966, in TNA, DO 213/76, 2-EA56/129/2, 1201, Secret, 
U.K. Eyes Only. 
90See Cabinet Official Working Party on Economic Implications of United Kingdom Policy in Southern 
Africa: African Countries other than South Africa and Rhodesia, August  12, 1966, Misc. 122 (66) 7, in 
TNA, OD 31/030, CSA 220/3/03A, Secret.  
91 See Cabinet Official Working Party on Economic Implications of United Kingdom Policy in Southern 
Africa: Inter-Departmental Study on the Effect of Possible Action from Zambia and Other African States 
– Note by the Board of Trade, August 12, 1966, Misc. 122 (66) 4, in TNA, OD 31/030, CSA 220/3/03A, 
Secret. 




Angola and the lack of mobilisation of popular masses. According to Savimbi, the GRAE 
had not been able to issue a programme involving all active Angolan revolutionary 
forces, beside having practically given up the military struggle. This was also due to the 
inculcation of the mercenary spirit among the soldiers, by paying them a salary each 
time they returned to Zaire after their incursions into Angola. Because of this habit, sol-
diers had been turned into a frontier army,93 rather than thrusting far into the territory 
they were supposed to liberate from colonialism. Finally, the leader of the FLNA was 
being portrayed as a little more than an American and Congolese puppet.94
     Concerning British analyses, the problem dealt with a possible joint international 
economic pressure on South Africa and Portugal. This is what the British government 
was wondering, as we can see from the number and length of the reports issued in those 
days. In that case, Britain’s economy would not have been harmed so much, and the 
most important imports coped with diamonds, wood, and cork. It was regarded as 
unlikely, however, that all African States take action to inflict the maximum possible 
damage on such a reliable commercial partner as the United Kingdom.
       
95
                                                 
93The frontier was continuously crossed to enter and leave the war zone in order to smuggle in arms, am-
munition, medicines and other stuff into the guerrilla bases. See I. BRINKMAN, Routes and War  for Inde-
pendence in Northern Angola (1961-74), in «Canadian Journal of African Studies», XL, 2, 2006, p. 212.   
 The point we 
always have to keep in mind is that for the British it was necessary to make a distinction 
between the moral condemnation of racially discrimination and a more practical ap-
proach to the issue, according to which it was impossible for Britain to take action 
against white regimes, unless failure to act became more harmful for London’s interests 
in Africa. In a word, no economic warfare against South Africa and Portugal was possi-
ble for the Atlantic Power, though in Portuguese Territories the verdict for white rule 
was less certain, due to a thinner settlement of the Europeans. The fear dominating Brit-
ish policies in those years dealt with the necessity sooner or later to be forced into a po-
sition and choose between one side or the other, thus sacrificing interests in an area of 
the continent and perhaps elsewhere. All this left Downing Street with no other choice 
than siding with both parties, trying not to alienate any commercial or political partner 
94 See J. SAVIMBI, Resignation Statement, August 16, 1964; Where Is the Angolan Revolution?, October 
1964, in CHILCOTE, Emerging Nationalism, cit., pp. 154-161. 
95See Cabinet Official Working Party on Economic Implications of United Kingdom Policy in Southern 
Africa: Report to Ministers - Note by the Secretary, August 26, 1966, Misc. 122 (66) 16, in TNA, OD 
31/030, CSA 220/3/03A, Secret. 
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in the region and bearing the risk to be accused by both sides of inconsistency and in-
sincerity.96 Such an allegation could have been even more serious, now that it seemed 
rebels in the North and in the South-East of the country were being armed and trained 
by the Chinese. This opened a new scenario which had not appeared in the old rebellion 
five years previously, with possible explosive African material within the international 
community.97 In view of what just mentioned, it was not by chance that the British Joint 
Intelligence Committee issued a report stating a long term outlook for the Southern Af-
rica region. According to the documentation provided, there was little doubt that black 
African States would seek to maintain support against apartheid regimes, but it was also 
true that their policies would unlikely be uniform. As concerned communist powers, 
London’s experts stated that they had till then shown little interest towards that part of 
the planet, but at the same time it seemed likely that they would back African liberation 
movements as an easy way to embarrass the West. However, even so it appeared ex-
tremely difficult for African liberation movements to successfully challenge the existing 
order, as the dominant factor was supposed to be the determination of white minorities 
to keep their privileges.98
                                                 
96 See Report from P.H. Gore-Booth to the Secretary of State: Policy towards Southern Africa, November 
29, 1966, in TNA, FO 953/2483, PLA Planning Staff, Secret.   
 Actually, British experts did not doubt that one day Angola 
would gain independence, but at the same time they thought that in some parts of the 
country the Portuguese were already able to set up some form of multi-racial society. A 
model like Brazil was believed to be quite likely, though it would meet the antipathy of 
surrounding African countries, whose leaders were more inclined to the idea of a com-
plete black Africa South of the Sahara. However, Foreign Office comments were that 
for some years to come independence based on majority rule would only bring to anar-
chy. In addition, democracy was something still un-experimented in Portugal herself. 
With the passing of Salazar a gradual easing of the authoritarian regime was possible, 
but certainly this could not lead to a liberal evolution in the colonies. This was made 
even more serious by the fact that Angolan Africans were not regarded as able to con-
97See Despatch No. 15 from Mr. Stewart to Sir A. Lambert (Lisbon): Angola – State of Internal Security, 
December 30, 1966, in TNA, FCO 25/269, Portuguese Africa - Political Affairs-Internal - Angola: Internal 
Security, JP 1/4, Secret. 
98See Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee: The Prospects for Southern Africa up to 1976, February 
27, 1967, in TNA, CAB 163/55, Africa - Southern Africa: Political-Economic Threats to S. Africa, JIC (67) 




tribute to the success of independence, since most of them were still illiterate and super-
stitious. On the other hand, the economy was booming and the European population was 
growing at a remarkable rate. This allowed Whitehall analysts to comment that a suffi-
ciently determined European population in Southern Africa could without difficulty 
control an indigenous community twenty times as big.99 That was why Downing Street 
was in favour of the right of self-determination for Portuguese Territories, but any claim 
of immediate independence would not be backed by the British Executive.100
     As concerned the American Administration, President Johnson had committed him-
self to ending racial discrimination in the United States, while his country still had eco-
nomic and strategic ties with Pretoria. In fact, the CIA warned that South Africa was a 
major supplier of minerals for the West, especially gold and uranium. As a consequence 
of this, black South Africans were turning towards radicalism and “black conscious-
ness”, a movement which paralleled that of “black power”.
             
101 In the meantime, CIA re-
ports noticed that liberation movements in Southern Africa would be probably suffering 
lack of indigenous support, without any chance to expand insurgency operations suffi-
ciently enough to shake white regimes.102
                                                 
99See Luanda Despatch No. 7 of the 25th of August, 1967 to Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Lisbon, Sep-
tember 2, 1967, in TNA, FCO 25/278, Angola - Political Affairs; Political Development, 1012, Confiden-
tial. 
 As concerned the Soviet Union and commu-
nist China, though seeking to expand their influence by providing limited military and 
financial assistance, they were not thought to be willing to engage in direct military in-
tervention. What leaves us rather perplexed after reading some American records is the 
fact that, though clearly reported that defence expenditures for Angola and Mozambique 
were running to over forty per cent of the Portuguese budget, apparently no-one was 
aware that a small country like Portugal could have never afforded such a high level of 
expense without in a few years running the risk of going bankruptcy. Perhaps comments 
100Minister of State’s Talk to the Africa Centre on 16 October: Portuguese Territories, undated, in TNA, 
FCO 25/291, UK Policy on Portuguese Africa: Political Affairs - Bilateral, JP 3/5, Unclassified.   
101See T. BORSTELMANN, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global 
Arena, Cambridge, MA and London, Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 200. 
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never been integrated into the regional economic network dominated by South Africa and, apart from 
diamond trading, she had received very little investment from South African firms. See O.E. KAHN, 
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like these were also due to the frontline States’ economic dependence on Rhodesia and 
Portuguese Africa. Even the government of Zambia, which was so dedicated to the 
cause of liberation, was behaving in quite a circumspect way, despite recent infiltrations 
into Rhodesia by African guerrillas.103 Presumably, such a skeptical view of African 
chances to overthrow white regimes was also the outcome of what American protégés 
like Holden Roberto had communicated to U.S. officers on the spot. In particular, the 
President of GRAE expressed doubts based on the belief that the African States were in-
capable of working together for the common good of Africa.104 Moreover, he had ex-
pressed deep apprehension about the ideology promulgated by a number of African 
governments, being not convinced that the OAU could be a cohesive force.105 Mean-
while, the violent struggle undertaken by blacks in Southern Africa, seen as the only 
way to achieve freedom denied by white regimes, persuaded a lot of liberal politicians 
and church leaders to withdraw their sympathy to African liberation movements.106
                                                 
103See National Intelligence Estimate: The Liberation Movements of Southern Africa, November 24, 
1967, NIE 70-1-67, Secret, Controlled Dissem., in www.foia.cia.gov.  
 
From a strategic point of view, instead, Angola and Mozambique were viewed as able to 
affect the whole balance of power in white Southern Africa and on a global level the 
relations between East and West. African governments in the two Portuguese provinces, 
in fact, would have extended Black Africa to the borders of Rhodesia and South Africa, 
thus augmenting the possibility of guerrilla actions against gold and diamond resources 
of Pretoria and Rhodesia’s chrome. As a matter of fact, for a couple of years already the 
Gulf Oil Company had been drilling in the Cabinda enclave and in 1968 was planning 
to start production, with the outlook to stretch the output area to the Congo republics, 
thus involving international majors able to supply both metropolitan Portugal and the 
104It may be argued that African States mistook Kennedy’s rhetoric, encouraged by the fear that the Soviet 
Union would gain influence in the continent, for policy, misestimating that the high ideological confronta-
tion between the superpowers would increase their leverage on the West over Southern African issues. 
See A. GUELKE, Southern Africa and the Superpowers, in «International Affairs», LVI, 4, Autumn 1980, 
p. 651.   
105See Airgram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State: Comments by GRAE President, 
October 26, 1967, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files, PORT 30-2 ANG, Confidential. 
106See T.J. NOER, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-




Republic of South Africa.107 Of course, this allowed the Portuguese to be more confi-
dent in the future, as oil revenues were supposed to be used to finance the colonial war 
and the Americans were expected to treat Lisbon more charitably.108
     In view of the available documentation, we cannot be surprised if the British gov-
ernment was practically obliged to keep an ambiguous stance. Potentially one of the 
richest countries in the region, with a vast array of mineral reserves and geographically 
located in both Southern and central Africa, Angola was at the crossroad of an impor-
tant trading network from Zambia and Zaire, which after the assassination of Patrice 
Lumumba had become Washington’s main ally in the area.
      
109 Despite all declarations of 
intent on the right of self-determination and the consequent diplomatic support at the 
United Nations, London could not really afford to undermine relations with white re-
gimes in the area, as they were economically and strategically too important for the 
West. According to scholars studying Soviet policies towards Africa, it is important to 
bear in mind, supposed communism or anti-communism, as well as a pro-Soviet posture 
or an anti-Soviet one, had rarely been a pivotal factor influencing African nationalism. 
On the other hand, where these labels mattered more was in determining the source of 
foreign aid. As a “marxist” organisation, in fact, the MPLA had failed to win Western 
support, but had managed to receive Soviet funds.110
                                                 
107The Portuguese dictator welcomed foreign participation as long as it did not become a way to denation-
alise the colonies. See A.K. SMITH, António Salazar and the Reversal of Portuguese Colonial Policy, in 
«The Journal of African History», XV, 4, 1974, p. 654.    
 In particular, Neto had met Ernesto 
Che Guevara for the first time in Brazzaville in early 1964 when, despite the poor mili-
tary record he had managed to impress the Cuban leader sufficiently enough to persuade 
him to promise military and political support for the MPLA. Moreover, in the late 1960s 
the MPLA was developing a consistent ideological outlook reflecting Marxist-Leninist 
thought and by 1968 the leadership had by then decided to set up a sort of vanguard 
party to lead the coalition of groups within the movement itself. Actually, several main 
MPLA representatives stressed that such a line should be neither pro-Chinese, nor pro-
Soviet. Rather, it was a question of assembling a genuine nationalistic and scientifically 
108See Luanda Despatch to Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Lisbon: Oil and Politics in Angola, February 
29, 1968, in TNA, FCO 25/310, Cabinda Oil: Fuel and Power, JP 12/4, Confidential. 
109See M. HOLNESS, Angola: The Struggle Continuous, in P. JOHNSON - D. MARTIN, eds., Destructive En-
gagement: Southern Africa at War, Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, p. 73. 
110See C. STEVENS, The Soviet Union and Angola, in «African Affairs», LXXV, 299, April 1976, p. 139.   
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socialist movement. Despite this, the first guerrilla fighters had been already sent to 
Cuba for training two years previously and seventy to eighty per cent of arms came 
from the Soviet Union.111 As regarded Cuban-Angolan relations in particular, soon after 
independence, in December 1975 Fidel Castro stressed the common ethnic features of 
the two populations, as a lot of Cubans were the ancestors of African slaves, who had 
fought in the Liberating Army of Cuba.112 Havana had been particularly interested in 
Guinea-Bissau’s revolution and the ideas of Amilcar Cabral. As an evidence of this, 
Cuban commandos were first sent to Africa to assist Cabral’s struggle, beside setting up 
a military training team in the People’s Republic of Congo, where also the MPLA had its 
headquarters.113 Responding to the allegations that the Cubans were acting as a Soviet 
proxy, Castro said that the Russians had never requested Havana to send soldiers to 
make war on their behalf.114
     British exports to Angola for 1966 totalled about 8.5 million pounds with a heavy 
share of vehicles and tractors and covering eleven per cent of the market and placing 
Britain as third supplier to Angola, after metropolitan Portugal and West Germany. 
Apart from oil, coffee and diamonds were the largest exported commodities, while sec-
ondary industries included building material, shipyards, and quite a thriving fishing in-
dustries. The logical outcome for the British was the will to open new markets to their 
enterprises.
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111See D. OTTAWAY - M. OTTAWAY, Afrocommunism, New York, NY, Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 
1981, pp. 100-102.  
 Moreover, Angola offered at least three good ports with convenient ac-
cess to the Northern hemisphere, thus making believe that, whatever form of govern-
ment in the future, Luanda was probably to emerge as one of the wealthiest parts in the 
continent. In the late 1960s, in fact, new factories were being opened in the mineral and 
motor sector, which gave Britain a positive outlook for exports. The question was even 
more serious for the UK was competing with other Western countries like Sweden and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, which already enjoyed a larger share of the Angolan 
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market.116 As concerned Angolan insurgents, in 1968 British records showed rather a 
negative outlook for them, as no charismatic leader had until then emerged as someone 
able to give unity and international prestige to the nationalist movement. For reasons 
like this, and also because of the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the population, Lon-
don’s experts believed that Angolan rebels had failed to win the support of people in 
any strategic area.117 Nothing was going to change, reports from Lisbon stated, as long 
as Salazar was in power. Instead, political separatism among the white population of 
Portuguese overseas territories was feared once the old dictator went. By the summer of 
1968 the colonial army seemed to have arrested the deterioration of the situation, also 
thanks to the hostility among nationalist movements. The Portuguese government de-
rived encouragement from several factors, such as continued American preoccupation 
for the war in Vietnam and the consequent reduced interests in African affairs, the poor 
performance of black independent States and their lowered romantic support to anti-
colonial struggle. However, no-one seemed seriously concerned for Portugal’s defence 
expenses, which covered by then forty-four per cent of the whole State budget. What is 
interesting, besides, is the observation according to which the development of a more 
democratic regime in Portugal was supposed to make the Lusophone presence in Africa 
profitable for Britain, due to the Western Power’s investments in the area and also to the 
fact that the Portuguese approach to racial questions was not regarded as morally repug-
nant.118
     A little room for manoeuvre was being given by Dr. Salazar’s health, which let 
Western diplomacy think that he was ready to give up and leave the government to 
more liberal wings of his entourage. However, his charisma among his followers was 
intact. This implied that Portugal’s African posture was not going to change, since even 
those of the new generation who were increasingly frustrated over home policies, 
strongly supported the idea of Portugal in Africa. After all, the cost of the wars in Africa 
                     
                                                 
116See Luanda Despatch to Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Lisbon: The Ambassador’s Visit and British 
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were still tolerable to the Portuguese in both human and fiscal terms, even though more 
and more people might be coming to accept the inevitability of future political adjust-
ments there. What was taken for granted was that any succession to Salazar would re-
quire the support of the armed forces.119 Salazar underwent emergency brain surgery on 
September 6 and ten years later he lapsed into a coma. The President of the Republic 
announced on the 26th that the doctors had determined the Prime Minister would not re-
cover. In consequence of that, he appointed Marcello Caetano at the head of the gov-
ernment. The first moves of the new Administration, to tell the truth, did not match 
American and British hopes on a more liberal approach towards African questions, as 
Foreign Minister Nogueira, speaking on behalf of the newly appointed Premier, said 
that Portugal’s policy with respect to overseas territories would not be changed at all.120
  
 
  4. Caetano and Nixon’s Tar Baby Policy 
 
Once Salazar was out of scene, the British Labour government studied the various op-
tions left in Southern Africa, also in light of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meet-
ing and the consequent relations with African leaders. A new moderate optimist view 
was expressed on the Caetano Administration, which therefore deserved some time to 
settle in and develop a more realistic and flexible policy. As concerned allegations on 
Portugal taking advantage of her membership of NATO, the Cabinet replied that in case 
of expulsion from the Western Alliance due to Lisbon’s African policy, it would be-
come much more difficult to put pressure in the desired direction of self-determination. 
To tell the truth, by simply reading economic data Whitehall would have been perfectly 
able to realise that it was extremely difficult for the Portuguese to change their mind on 
questions like those. As a matter of fact, for a dictatorial junta like that in power in Lis-
bon for about forty years it was impossible to give up Portugal’s biggest market for ex-
ports.121
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determination to what was not even regarded as a colony was not a realistic way to see 
the problem. Being so persistent on the moral suasion towards the Latin ally was proba-
bly just a way to put the problem off and let white minorities in Southern Africa reach a 
settlement with the Africans without renouncing their hegemonic position. Actually, 
despite some slight improvement in domestic issues, such as students being allowed to 
mildly demonstrate and the return from the exile of the leader of the Socialist opposi-
tion, Mario Soares, nothing seemed changed in the government’s attitude towards An-
gola. In a speech delivered in the National Assembly, Caetano repeated that Portuguese 
settlers in Africa were Africans regardless of their complexion and that the government 
could not abandon them, being responsible for the security and well being of all its citi-
zens, as well as committed to defend all civilisation against imperialist aggression. 
Moreover, nothing dissuaded the Prime Minister from believing that Southern Africa 
needed the white man.122
     As concerned the Americans, at the end of the Johnson’s mandate, the State Depart-
ment had left a detailed analysis on Southern Africa. The real dilemma was always the 
same, that is how to conciliate indigenous claims with the safeguarding of American 
geo-political interests. Washington’s aims in the area could be summed up as follows: a) 
encouraging substantial and long-term changes; b) reducing violence and confrontation; 
c) minimising the negative outcome of violence on national interests.
   
123 Racial tensions 
gave communist countries excellent opportunities at a very low price, through funds to 
nationalist movements and assistance to black States.124
                                                 
122See Mr. Welbore Ker to Mr. Stewart: Portugal. Two Months under Professor Marcello Caetano, De-
cember 6, 1968, in TNA, FCO 46/251, Portuguese Facilities: Defence Value to UK, DP 1/354/1, WSP 
1/1/14, Confidential.  
 What influenced the Ameri-
cans’ assessment most was the belief that the liberation movements of the area were not 
regarded as capable of overcoming the resistance of the white regimes for at least a few 
more years to come. Moreover, the Americans had investments amounting to more than 
123See Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council: National Policy Paper, Southern Africa, Novem-
ber 20, 1968, in NARA, RG 59, S/S Files, Lot 70 D263, SIG/MEMO, #107-11/22/68-U.S. Policy toward 
Southern Africa, 47th SIG Meeting, Secret, Noform.  
124See Memorandum of Meeting - Senior Interdepartmental Group: Chairman’s Summary of Discussion 
and Decisions at the 47th SIG Meeting, December 3, 1968, in NARA, RG 59, S/S Files, Lot 70 D263, 
SIG/RA, #49-12/9/68 - Chairman’s Summary of Discussion and Decisions at the 47th Meeting, 12/3/68, 
Secret. 
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a billion dollars in the area,125 while in Angola the Portuguese kept a strict control on 
the economic process by restricting foreign investments, though in the last period this 
trend had been relaxed to speed up development, especially as concerned raw material 
industries.126 On the other hand, Caetano was showing his ability to exploit Cold War 
tensions by playing the card of the Soviet threat, thus stressing the need for cooperation 
between the U.S. and European countries. According to the Prime Minister, the tribal 
state of native populations both in the Portuguese territories and in the other African 
lands made elections a farce. Moreover, he thought that subversion in the Portuguese 
provinces had a foreign base and that the masses were only able to express the thinking 
of certain leaders, rather than their own feelings. As concerned the American position 
on that, it is easy to find out that Washington agreed with the other Atlantic power on 
the Portuguese presence in Africa, which was not something to cancel and about which 
the Americans were not conducting any crusade.127 The new President, Richard Nixon, 
pursued dialogue with Portugal and did not want his administration – to quote his own 
words – to continue using doctrinaire views in foreign policy,128 as the choices of the 
previous administrations were no longer thought to match American national interests. 
According to new CIA reports, in fact, though African élites were not so easy to influ-
ence from abroad, any circumstance undermining relations with the West could be ex-
ploited by the Soviets, despite not even the American intelligence believed that the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology could get deeply rooted in a continent crossed by waves of 
economic nationalism. As a matter of fact, nationalism, and certainly not communism, 
was likely to be the dominant theme in African policies towards the outside world.129
                                                 
125See R. MORRIS, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, New York, NY-
San Francisco, CA-London, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977, p. 108.          
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dential, in www.cia.foia.gov. 
127 Memorandum of Conversation: The Secretary’s Visit to Madrid and Lisbon November 16-19: Azores 
Base, November 19, 1968, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S, Secret. 
128 See Memorandum of Conversation: US-Portuguese Relations, April 19, 1969, in D.S. PATTERSON, 
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798-801.   
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On the other hand, Chinese diplomacy was gaining ground.130 Maoist ideology, in fact, 
gave Beijing a leading role in the world revolution and the struggle against colonialism 
and white racism. Hence, Africa was by then playing a pivotal role in Chinese foreign 
policy and the most effective insurgent group significantly supported by communist 
China was the Mozambique Liberation Front. In addition, the old dictator was pursuing 
something like a “dollar diplomacy” and to this end Zambia offered the best outlook in 
terms of commercial and political expansion.131 Such an attitude responded to the so-
called Three Worlds Theory, developed by the Chinese leader and illustrating that inter-
national relations comprehended three politico-economic spheres: the first world, 
formed of superpowers, the second world of lesser powers, and the third world of ex-
ploited countries. The difference from the classic school of thought was that Chairman 
Mao included both the United States and the Soviet Union in the First World, which, 
respectively, were responsible of imperialism and social imperialism. Japan, Europe, 
and Canada composed the Second World, while Africa, Latin America, and the rest of 
Asia formed the Third World. A few years afterwards, in April 1974, the then Chinese 
Vice-Premier Deng-Xiaoping explained the Three Worlds Theory in a speech to the 
United Nations, specifying that the two superpowers were the biggest international ex-
ploiters, threatening the independence and security of all nations. Concerning this par-
ticular point, the Chinese politician said that the superpowers had adopted neo-
colonialist methods to continue and intensify their exploitation and plunder of the de-
veloping countries, by exporting capital and building there a “State within a State” by 
means of such international monopoly organizations as “trans-national corporations”.132
                                                                                                                                               
fice of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2005, Doc. No. 1, in 
www.state.gov. 
 
Mao’s emphasis on the existence and importance of a third force enabled China to de-
velop her own identity and expand her own influence in international relations. Theo-
130The escalation of tension with Beijing made the Soviets seek access to possible Indian Ocean transit 
facilities in Southern Africa, thus developing a confrontation within Cold War relations. See M. WEBBER, 
Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Final Phase, in «The Journal of Modern African Studies», 
XXX, 1, March 1992, p. 19.      
131See Directorate of Intelligence – Special Report Weekly Review No. 32: Communist China’s Presence 
in China, June 20, 1969, Secret, in FRUS 1969-1976, vol. E-5, part 1, doc. n. 5, in www.state.gov. 
132See Speech By Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-Ping, At the 
Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, April 10, 1974, in www.marxists.org. 
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retically, the Asian giant had defined an area that belonged neither to the Soviet Union 
nor to the United States. In particular, Chairman Mao declared full sympathy and sup-
port for the struggle of the Africans against imperialism and colonialism.133 Beijing’s 
economic aid to Third World countries backed the view that the struggle for political 
independence would be incomplete unless followed by a nationalised, self-sufficient 
economy. However, the Chinese Communist Party’s leaders miscalculated the complex-
ity and diversity of the Third World, by insisting on a united struggle against both revi-
sionism and imperialism. China failed to consider that each country had its own concep-
tion of national interest and wanted to define its own relationship with the superpowers. 
In light of this, a transition from revolutionary chaos to pragmatic reconstruction began 
a new stage of Chinese foreign policy in the late 1960s, based on the concept of a united 
front of China, the U.S. and sympathetic Third World countries against the Soviet Un-
ion.134
     In contrast to this, a definition reminding Lenin and provided in the Brezhnev era by 
Karen Brutents, a leading Soviet scholar on the Third World and later an important offi-
cial under Gorbachev, underlines that national liberation movements produced revolu-
tions aimed at getting rid of any foreign economic and political domination, including of 
course the one originating from colonial subjugation, and setting up fully sovereign 
States. Traditionally, Soviet doctrine considered every colonial area as a nation invested 
with national sovereignty. As a consequence of this, any subject people was a victim of 
aggression and therefore entitled under international law to adopt whatever forms of 
warfare necessary to resist and overcome the aggressor.
 
135
                                                 
133See S. GILLESPIE, Diplomacy on a South-South Dimension: The Legacy of Mao’s Three-Worlds Theory 
and the Evolution of Sino-African Relations, pp. 112,118, in www.diplomacy.edu. 
 In the late 1960s, in the com-
petition with China the advantage still lay with Moscow in the Southern African area, as 
Beijing lacked resources to seriously compete for prime clients. In spite of this, the So-
viet military felt that American stalemate in Vietnam and the achievement of essential 
equivalence at the strategic nuclear level had opened possibilities to fight imperialism 
with minimal risk of superpower confrontation. The outcome of this revision, as well as 
the analysis of small scale regional wars and civil conflicts, was the expansion of the 
134See ibid., pp. 119-121. 
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scope of what was interpreted as war of national liberation, which became also a con-
frontation within Third World nations not necessarily involving Western countries.136 
On the other hand, the Americans were by then persuaded that China and the Soviet Un-
ion would benefit from violent conflict under new black majority regimes. As a matter 
of fact, the United States had relations with several black-ruled States in Southern Af-
rica, and Zambia was even purchasing weapons from the Americans in an attempt to 
avert possible attacks from the white minority. This put Washington in quite an awk-
ward position, as the last thing the White House wanted was to be perceived by the 
white regimes in the area as an open supporter of black majority rule. In order to safe-
guard economic interests and investments, Washington decided that the minority re-
gimes did not have to fall, and that change would be coming through collaboration be-
tween the two ethnic groups, rather than with violent means.137
                                                 
136See ibid., pp. 96-98. 
 Actually, in front of the 
stagnation of the West on Southern Africa’s racial issues, Julius Nyerere warned that 
with no other alternatives the blacks in the area would fight for their rights and the 
front-line States would have no choice but help them. Despite this, a lot of governments, 
though firmly condemning South African and Portuguese policies, did not wish to com-
plicate their relations with the Western powers by letting Chinese and Soviet weapons 
cross their territory. Nyerere, instead, gave this permission with a heavy heart, but at the 
same time pursued the Western powers’ support to majority rule negotiations. However, 
Africans could not fight with bows and arrows just to prove that they were Africans and 
the only ones willing to give arms to the national liberation movements were the com-
munist countries. The Tanzanian President expressed his concern in a speech in Canada 
in April 1969, during which he stated that «the Freedom fighters use communist arms 
and are trained in communist countries because they have no choice. […] And then 
South Africa and Portugal will proclaim […] this “proof” that they are fighting commu-
nism […] I am afraid that Western States would strengthen their support for the South-
137See R.L. STEVENSON, U.S. African Policy under Henry Kissinger, in H. WALTON, JR. - R.L. STEVEN-
SON - J.B. ROSSER, SR., eds., The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: A Docu-
mentary Analysis, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2010, pp. 84-85. 
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ern African regimes […] and gradually this conflict will become the ideological conflict 
which at present it is not».138
     The new American Administration made the firm decision to put African affairs at 
the bottom of the political agenda, as it had been repeated by Nixon himself to the Por-
tuguese Foreign Minister when he said that European allies came first and that a com-
pletely new approach was followed at the White House.
 
139 This version is confirmed by 
Franco Nogueira, who in his memoirs writes that Nixon announced his Administration 
was going to change the policy towards Southern Africa. According to the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister’s reconstruction, Nixon was rather surprised about the situation in the 
area and the outcome of the sanctions imposed especially on Rhodesia, which made the 
United States dependent on the chrome imported from the Soviet Union, while the one 
produced in Rhodesia was being sold to China, which used it for nuclear weapons pro-
duction.140 The President briefed his National Security Advisor, Henry Alfred Kiss-
inger, and his top officials about this decision and specified he did not want his timeta-
ble to include meetings relating to Africa, about which he only asked for a report on the 
general situation in the continent twice a year.141 In light of this, when in May 1969 
fourteen African States in Lusaka issued a Manifesto to condemn racial discrimination 
in the area – though with quite a conciliatory tone, as the liberation of Southern Africa 
did not mean racialism in reverse –, Kissinger was extremely realist: «[…] African 
leaders will not abandon their basic opposition to white minority rule, yet they can’t 
reach their objective […] without outside […] support».142
     The African context and the relations among black States had been translated into the 
meeting in April 1969 of East and central African States in Lusaka, during which a 
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Manifesto on Southern Africa had been issued, emphasising equal rights and human 
dignity. At the same time, rather than calling for a commitment to immediate change, 
the document simply called for change and peaceful progress, though in case of armed 
struggle all black States were supposed to aid freedom fighters. As concerned Portu-
guese Territories, the colonial power had been criticised not for racialism, but rather for 
the will to exist in the black continent. Should Lisbon accept the principle of self-
determination, the document stated, the front line capitals could try to ask the guerrilla 
movements to put down arms and then white settlers would be welcomed by new black 
independent governments.143 The document acknowledged the right of all the whites 
who had settled to stay there and accepted that change could not come overnight.144 The 
Manifesto, later to adopted by the UN General Assembly, suggested a diplomatic solu-
tion to the wars in Southern Africa, emphasising the desirability of a negotiated end to 
apartheid, so long as South Africa accepted the principles of human equality and dig-
nity’. Mandela’s ANC opposed the statement, but did not make its objections public, as 
it did not want to antagonise those countries that harboured its military and political 
cadres.145
    In the meantime, the South African Premier, John Vorster, had perfectly realised that 
friendly relations with as many black States as possible were necessary, if South Africa 
did not want to become totally isolated while more and more African countries reached 
independence. The Prime Minister focused on economic aspects, knowing that the new 
nations needed economic assistance. As an evidence of this, on December 11, 1969, the 
governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa herself signed a Cus-
toms Union Agreement. The principle of non interference was at the basis of the so-
called outward-looking policy, stressing Pretoria’s successful trading performance in the 
past two decades, together with scientific and cultural exchanges, and this was some-
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thing the British and the Americans could not afford to ignore. According to Vorster, 
South Africa’s neighbours had nothing to fear from, as Pretoria recognised the inde-
pendence of Black African States.146 On the other hand, the South Africans were secur-
ing their own “white belt”, by augmenting military and commercial relations with colo-
nial Angola and at the same time, the more successful national liberation movements 
were, the more South African rulers tried to play movements of armed opposition off 
against each other.147 As regarded this, the British expressed surprise towards the late 
timing of an initiative like that, since if Angola were relinquished by the Portuguese, 
Pretoria would expose her left flank in South West Africa to the local liberation move-
ments. This was the outcome of the more liberal approach of the Caetano Government, 
which no longer ward off foreign activities.148
     From the African point of view, instead, political and social stability were a pivotal 
aim to achieve in order to gain real independence which often existed only on paper, 
since key decisions for the integrity of African nations were taken without any reference 
to them. This is what Julius Nyerere denounced in a speech delivered at the University 
of Toronto on October 2, 1969. This was associated to the need of political stability in 
order to avoid outside forces to take advantage of African divisions by exacerbating lo-
cal conflicts. As concerned the particular situation of Southern Africa, the Tanzanian 
President said it was impossible for black independent States not to be involved in op-
posing the policies of colonial powers. Accepting the continuation of such conditions 
was a denial of the African moral right to freedom and equality. Even the existence of 
the front-line States, he said, was in jeopardy due to colonialist and racial regimes of the 
area, which would inevitably try to reduce the effectiveness of black States’ policies. 
That was why the situation in Southern Africa could not be regarded as a local problem, 
since all Africans as such were by then involved. Self-determination of the peoples of 
Southern Africa and the other Portuguese colonies, therefore, had become a common 
objective of all Africans. What kind of socio-political system came after independence 
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was an affair of the population of those territories. Hence, Tanzania was ready to help 
whatever kind of insurgents struggling for independence, no matter whether they were 
liberal or communists. Finally, Nyerere did not think that violence was a good way to 
pursue this task; however, if the door to freedom was locked and bolted the choice was 
very straightforward. Such was the case of Southern Africa, whose minority regimes 
had even rejected in principle the demand for freedom, thus leaving organised violence 
against the government as the only path to get what was a just African right.149 On what 
concerned non-alignment, he said a few months afterwards that these countries did not 
form any bloc, being all different from one another in terms of socio-political system 
and all facing different problems, both domestic and dealing with foreign relations. 
What was in common was only their non-alignment, that is their existence as weaker 
nations, trying to keep their independence and use it for their own benefit, as the real 
danger came form poverty and the relating need to look outside for capital investment. 
Therefore, political independence was based on the level of economic sovereignty. In 
order to avoid economic colonialism, Nyerere claimed co-operation among non-aligned 
nations, in terms for example of sales operations on a co-operative base instead of com-
peting in the world market.150 Along the same lines there was what Kenneth Kaunda in 
1968 had called the Mulungushi Economic Revolution. This spoke about the acquisition 
of majority shareholdings in big enterprises, both national and international, seeking to 
encourage a Zambian domestic business and industrial network and at the same time 
reserving the government contracts in several sectors of them.151
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 Like his colleague, 
Kaunda repeated that the main aim of his country’s foreign policy was the creation of 
the necessary conditions for the peaceful transfer of power from irresponsible white 
hands to reliable black hands. These efforts, however, had always been hampered by 
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NATO members by pouring in investments and military hardware towards white minor-
ity regimes.152
     In December 1969, the National Security Council suggested a new policy on South-
ern Africa. The National Security Study Memorandum 39 became a turning point of the 
Nixon Administration as an extremely realist record stating that sorting out racial prob-
lems and colonial conflicts in that region of the world did not match American inter-
ests.
   
153 Nixon’s attitude was probably influenced by Kissinger’s belief that national lib-
eration movements were a little more than puppets in the hands of communist pow-
ers.154 The present policy aim, it was reported, was to try to balance American eco-
nomic, scientific and strategic interests in the area with the political interest to have the 
White House dissociated from white minority regimes’ repressive racial policies. De-
spite that, the whites were there to stay and try to overthrow minority rule through vio-
lence was supposed to be a way to favour communist insurgence or infiltration. Col-
laboration with the whites was therefore essential, as well as a moderate pressure to 
make them change attitude towards the black majority in view of a gradual process of 
reconciliation. As concerned the Portuguese Territories, Washington chose to take Lis-
bon’s more moderate policies as suggesting further changes, while at the same time 
black front-line States had to seek closer relations with white-dominated States in view 
of better future conditions. The arms embargo on Portuguese overseas provinces was to 
be maintained, but the big change was that the Nixon Administration decided to give 
more liberal treatment to exports of dual purpose equipment and also encourage trade 
and investment.155
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and weapons in the colonies if only that stuff could be used for civil purposes as well.156 
In reaching these conclusions, the White House was clearly led by the strategic impor-
tance of the Azores base and the Portuguese African territories to Cold War defence 
planning. From an economic point of view, moreover, Angola served as the door to one 
of the mineral richest parts of Africa and Portugal’s encouragement of foreign capital 
resulted in more competitive activity by American and European multinationals for ex-
ploration and possible exploitation of iron ore, diamonds, sulphur and phosphates de-
posits.157 Hence, Washington aimed at extending the NATO zone as far South as the 
Cape of Good Hope to challenge the growing presence of Soviet naval power in the In-
dian Ocean and therefore chose to keep a low profile on the opposition to Portugal’s 
African posture.158 This also implied that the United Nations, with the Afro-Asian bloc 
forming up to one-third of the membership, had by then become an important forum 
where racial issues and the American posture towards Southern Africa affected relations 
with the rest of the world and the relating access to African and Asian areas, thus put-
ting  in jeopardy 2.5 billion dollars of investments in Africa, one-third of which in the 
white regimes.159
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we have to avoid the colonialist label, but we must analyse where our interest lies and 
not worry too much about other people’s domestic policies».160
     The confirmation of this shift came with the State of the Union Address on February 
18, 1970, when Nixon said that economic development was one of the two main Ameri-
can concerns on Africa, which was thus encouraged to welcome U.S. enterprises. At the 
same time, the Republican Head of State explicitly remarked that the continent had to 
be free from great power rivalry. As concerned Southern Africa in particular, he added: 
«Though we abhor the racial policies of the white regimes, we cannot agree that pro-
gressive change in Southern Africa is furthered by force. […] violence and the counter-
violence it inevitably provokes will only make more difficult the task of those on both 
sides working for progress on the racial question».
 
161
     The President and his main collaborators were persuaded that the previous Democ-
ratic Administrations had completely failed to achieve any pivotal result. On the con-
trary, the only outcome had been that South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia had aban-





5. Salazar’s Legacy 
According to British analyses, the dawn of the post-Salazar era looked quite bright in 
Angola, where the Gulf Oil Company was by then exploiting crude oil from the conces-
sions in Cabinda, and in December 1969 the multinational had been said to be produc-
ing at a rate of 40,000 barrels per day, while the Belgian-Portuguese Petrangol were ex-
tracting another 20,000 barrels per day, thus giving an estimate total production in An-
gola of almost 3 million tons for 1969, compared with 0.75 million in the previous year. 
The output was so promising, that seventeen more oil companies were applying for new 
concessions in Southern Angola. The potential of the colony in terms of minerals pro-
duction and food stuff, as well as political stability, was vast, said the Financial Times, 
and Britain had to be careful to take her own share of these new markets. This last ob-
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servation was particularly meaningful, as it was clear that the British business sector 
was showing good confidence in Caetano’s efforts to pacify and develop the African 
province. In particular, Caetano had summed up in the following way the chief points of 
his government’s policy towards overseas territories: a) consolidation of multi-racial 
societies; b) progressive autonomy for provincial governments; c) extension of people’s 
participation in political and administrative structures163. Despite that, the sheer volume 
of European immigrants the government had been encouraging for at least two decades 
was angering urban Africans even more, since they found themselves pushed further 
down the social and economic ladder. In spite of claims of non-racial attitude and legis-
lation, the whole colonisation programme had been based on racist assumptions, as we 
can realise from Caetano’s words themselves: «The Natives of Africa must be directed 
and organised by Europeans, but are indispensable as auxiliaries. The blacks must be 
seen as productive elements in an economy directed by whites».164
     As concerned the Americans, by reading declassified documentation we realise how 
different the President’s view was from the policies of the Department of State. Accord-
ing to Foggy Bottom, in fact, the experience of the previous decade showed that there 
were serious doubts about Caetano’s expectations for a better time in colonial matters. 
On the contrary, in absence of any attempt of reconciliation, it seemed the gulf between 
Portugal and the black States was destined to widen. Such a situation was in no-one’s 
interests, bearing also the risk of increasing opportunities for communist influence.
 
165 
Unlike the White House, State Department officers had confidence in the Lusaka mani-
festo and thought it contained positive elements which could help Portugal reconcile 
European interests with those of African States and nationalist groups.166
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Nixon chose did not certainly pave the way to negotiations, though in public the Presi-
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dent was always careful to criticise racial policies. The Americans believed that foreign 
communists were able to exert massive and long-term influence over African left wing 
nationalists, thus blocking good relations with the West and putting the world balance in 
jeopardy.167 Only a few days after the Department of State remarks, in fact, Nixon de-
cided to except from the arms embargo on Portugal non-lethal equipment with a dual 
civilian and military usage.168 This was another sign that the Nixon Administration was 
quite sympathetic with the position of Portugal on Africa and such agreements helped 
harden Caetano’s thought that the kind of independence the United Nations were pursu-
ing in that part of the world was only a danger to civilization leading to the implantation 
of communism.169 In a word, Prime Minister Caetano stated that people had to realise 
that Portuguese sovereignty over African provinces was worth more than an adventure 
with an unpredictable outcome.170
     On June 18, 1970, the Conservative Party came back to power in Britain, being wel-
come by companies as a government more sensitive to market needs. The New Prime 
Minister, Edward Heath, did not show any particular enthusiasm for UN sanctions. As a 
matter of fact, the Cabinet issued a report on the economic implications of a possible 
lifting of the arms sales ban to South Africa, which also implied a substantial export in 
the private sector. Protests from many countries were to be expected, but none of them, 
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can continent offering a good trading outlook to Western enterprises. Hostility between 
white minority regimes and black African countries was of course a major threat to Brit-
ish interests. As concerned the question of self-determination, though recognising and 
endorsing such a principle for all peoples, and despite the fact that the denial by the Por-
tuguese of this right was only worsening racial tensions, the Labour government, as well 
as the Tory Administration, had the same stance as the Americans, as we can easily fig-
ure out by reading the document. It was surprising that the Africans had taken up arms, 
that was true, but then we read: «We condemn the use of force and we agree that free-
dom fighters rely to a worrying extent on external communist support».172
     The report reminded the one issued by the Americans a few months previously also 
on what regarded the collaboration with minority regimes. «We can, by selective relaxa-
tion of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their cur-
rent racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the 
black states […] help to draw the two groups together […]».
  
173
On the other hand, during the Security Council debate on December 30, 1969, Lord 
Caradon had paid a tribute to the Portuguese government on the fact that «[…] they 
maintain a policy of racial relations which is very different from the policy adopted in 
parts of Southern Africa […] if they were to adopt a policy of self-determination, Portu-




     It was true, as British diplomats reminded, that there was no legal racial bar in An-
gola and no racially segregated area or facility, though Angolan Africans formed the 
under-privileged majority. The problem the British Consulate General in Luanda high-
lighted was bound to Portuguese nationalism, which precluded the Europeans from ac-
cepting any form of local culture or the establishment of a kind of Angolan nationalism 
based on a Luso-African identity, able to be strong enough to face African nationalist 
feelings. On the other hand, the same despatch reporting such an optimistic outlook 
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showed also how the Portuguese were not developing an Angolan economy moulded on 
the Africans.175 As a matter of fact, there were no African controlled businesses, or 
Luso-African commercial partnerships in Angola, where the Portuguese kept a monop-
oly on retail and distribution trading, thus blocking the social lift for Africans.176 De-
spite this, there was quite a big difference between Portuguese territories and the other 
white minority regimes. No such thing like “settler power” did exist in Angola, Guinea, 
or Mozambique. Power in Portuguese Africa resided always with a colonial governor 
appointed from Lisbon, who ruled without necessarily taking into account the opinion 
of the residents of the territory, no matter whether white or black.177 In short, at the very 
end of the Wilson’s Government the main British objectives towards Portugal were: a) 
increasing London’s share of Portuguese market and secure some benefits of economic 
development in Angola and Mozambique; b) encouraging the transformation of Portu-
gal into a democratic country; c) persuading Portugal to accept the principle of self-
determination for her African provinces, whether as independent countries, or having 
federal ties with the mother-country; d) ensuring the availability to NATO and Britain of 
defence facilities in Metropolitan Portugal and the Azores. Just to be clear once more, 
the final version of this Foreign Office report stated that by keeping in contact with Lis-
bon over African questions too, it was possible to give some contribution towards the 
evolution of the Portuguese attitude on those issues.178
     Britain’s change of policy was on the way. The Government had decided to resume 
arms supply. Heath was persuaded that Black African countries had to learn to live with 
South Africa, as no-one was going to settle the Southern African problem by force. The 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Douglas-Home, stated that arms could be sold to any country 
unless declared an enemy. In addition, the Secretary of Defence said that a Soviet attack 
of any kind was not considered as a serious imminent risk, but he also added it would be 
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idle to pretend that Russian influence had not grown in the Mediterranean as well as the 
Middle East and the Red Sea.179
     As concerned the particular problem of Angola, in his valedictory despatch the Brit-
ish Consul General, Hugh Carless, quite prophetically predicted that the Portuguese 
would likely to remain in control of the province until at least 1975. The weakness of 
the colonial position was as evident as the economic development in progress in those 
years. As a matter of fact, the Portuguese stance was a source of embarrassment to lib-
eral opinion in the West, and lacking the practice of political democracy at home the 
Portuguese did not have any plan or strategy for the future, apart from hanging on and 
hoping for the best.
  
180 American conclusions were practically the same, since the Ad-
ministration complained about the lack of any moderate Black African bloc. Hence, the 
President was persuaded that a “local Leviathan” like South Africa could play an impor-
tant role, therefore putting off racial issues to an indefinite future.181 It is also true that 
the White House and Henry Kissinger were rather unaware of the complexity of exter-
nal support to the different parties involved in the liberation of Angola. Actually, he did 
not apparently care about the fact that the anti-communist party he would later choose to 
back in the civil war following independence was receiving most of its aid from the 




Downing Street was conscious of the tensions with Black Africa States, whose leaders 
they tried to convince that isolating the South African regime was only a way to con-
solidate it. Therefore, the best hope of bringing about a more liberal system lay in main-
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taining contacts between Pretoria and the outer world, relying on the economic pressure 
coming from industrial expansion.183
     Instead, what for Britain was a question of Cold War issues and balance of pay-
ments, for Black States was a matter of principle and honour. All defence motivations 
and speeches about the Soviet threat in the area did not convince the Africans on the 
necessity of coexisting with the South African Leviathan. For black Africa priority was 
South African and Portuguese policies of white supremacy. The Anglo-Saxon powers, 
however, had reached the same conclusions. Political stability was pivotal, as well as 
friendly relations with black independent States, in order for important countries not to 
quit the Commonwealth and implement discriminating measures against Great Britain. 
Nobody in the West thought that white communities in the area would ever give up 
power, nor that anyone would be able to win a large-scale war against them. Both At-
lantic powers were firm in denouncing racial discrimination and backing the principle of 
self-determination for everyone and in particular for the peoples of the Portuguese-ruled 
territories. However, on both shores of the Atlantic it was highlighted that Lisbon’s pol-
icy of racial toleration was an important factor along the path of emancipation, which 
ruled out the option of violence. Interesting to know is the different vision between the 
White House and the State Department, whose top executive after the tour of the conti-
nent proposed a document the President endorsed on March 26, 1970, which considered 
that it was American national interest to cooperate with African countries in their en-
deavors to improve conditions of life and to help in their efforts to build an equitable 
political and economic order.  
  
     What Washington sought, according to the document, was a relationship of construc-
tive cooperation with the nations of Africa. In particular, mineral and petroleum devel-
opment accounted for nearly three-fourths of U.S. private investment in Africa. On this 
issue, the Secretary was mindful of the special relationship between some African and 
some European countries. However, the Americans claimed their share of the market 
and therefore encouraged improved access for exports of African manufactures to the 
markets of all nations on an equal basis, also urging the elimination of discriminatory 
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tariffs putting U.S. goods at a competitive disadvantage in many African markets. As 
concerned the question of Southern Africa, pursuing peaceful change in the Portuguese 
territories did not undermine the right of self-determination, but the solution was to be 
found in the constructive interplay of political, economic and social forces. 184
     Instead, Henry Kissinger saw the Angolan problem in terms of global politics, being 
determined not to allow the Soviets to make a move in any part of the world without 
being militarily confronted. Angola was located near the shipping lanes of the giant 
tankers carrying oil around the Cape of Good Hope, but according to John Stockwell, 
the former CIA Chief of the Angola Task Force, Soviet bases in Somalia had much bet-
ter control of American shipping lanes and any military move against oil supplies in the 
Indian Ocean could trigger a chain reaction much more dangerous than the Russian 
presence in Angola. Stockwell thinks that Kissinger was simply seeking opportunities to 
challenge the Soviets, thus overruling his collaborators and refusing to seek diplomatic 
solutions. On this he was aided by both Zaire and Zambia, which feared the prospect of 
a Soviet-backed government on their flanks controlling the Benguela Railway.
  
185
     By reading Kissinger’s words a few years later, in 1975, we can easily assume how 
focused on Cold War and global issues Nixon’s main advisor was. «My assessment was 
if the Soviet Union can interfere eight thousand miles from home in a undisputed way», 
he writes in his memoirs, «[…] then the Southern African countries must conclude that 
the U.S. has abdicated in Southern Africa. […] They will then have two choices as to 
where to turn – to China or to the USSR».
  
186
      The following year, in light of the Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war, the 
former Harvard scholar said: «If Angola goes Communist, it will have an effect in An-
gola, in Zaire, in Zambia, etc. These countries can only conclude that the U.S. is no 
longer a factor in Southern Africa. We will pay it for decades».
  
187
     Actually, Moscow had a real interest in gaining influence in whatever new States 
emerged from the decolonisation process, but assuming that this could be achieved 
  
                                                 
184See Secretary Rogers to President Nixon: U.S. and Africa in the 70’s, March 26, 1970, No classifica-
tion marking, in FRUS 1969-1976, vol. E-5, part 1, doc. n. 11, in www.state.gov. 
185See J. STOCKWELL, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, London, Andre Deutsch Limited, 1978, p. 43.   
186H.A. KISSINGER, Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1999, p. 792. 
187 Ibid., p. 807. 
Realpolitik and African Nationalism 
665 
without any costs or constraints meant overestimating USSR power. Moreover, Soviet 
intervention in the Third World was designed to contain Chinese moves,188 rather than 
to make life difficult for the West.189
     African States like Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, focused their arguments on the alli-
ance among former colonies and a dictatorial imperial reality such as Portugal, which 
was inflaming the whole area. Instead, the two Atlantic Powers were persuaded the “co-
lonial belt” would grant stability and protection from radical infiltrations, while any vio-
lent overthrow of existing regimes would expose the area to the communist threat. This 
Cold War paradigm was then exploited by the white regimes to influence Western Pow-
ers, by proclaiming that movements of black emancipation were inspired and manipu-
lated by communist forces. South Africa’s grand strategy was initially aimed at keeping 
white-ruled neighbours strong, then keeping black-governed neighbours as militarily 
weak and economically dependent as possible. According to an MPLA statement dating 
back to March 25, 1970, in fact, the South Africans had deployed their defence forces in 
Angola to take part in enemy operations in the Luanda region.
   
190
     To tell the truth, the Americans did not need to be abused by the South Africans in 
order to follow such a version. In the Summer of 1970, in fact, the Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research issued a note suggesting that the Soviets might be increasing their 
support to national liberation movements. Moscow was thought to have become even 
more bullish in Africa and the activities in Angola were supposed to enhance the posi-
tion of the Soviet-backed liberation movements to those aided by the Chinese, thus pro-
voking more and more tension.
  
191
     On the British side, the main objective in Southern Africa was to avoid direct con-
frontation between black independent States and white-ruled countries. Like the other 
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Anglo-Saxon government, Whitehall sought dialogue and détente in the area, hoping 
that in the long-run the white regime would evolve towards a non racialist direction. 
Majority rule was the final aim, but violence was excluded as a way to achieve it. 
Therefore, Downing Street was ready to side with Portugal on this particular issue at the 
United Nations and cast her veto. Actually, this was also due to the British will to in-
crease the market share in metropolitan Portugal and in her overseas provinces as con-
cerned the exploitation of natural resources, always with the optimistic outlook that in 
the future the Lusophone country should develop a more democratic system and a more 
liberal and market oriented economy.192
     American objectives were practically the same as the British ones, for they dealt with 
the lessening of border tensions, the development of local institutions with significant 
African participation and a better understanding of U.S. African policy by both black 
and white Angolans. Such an attitude was even more felt in those days, as the Angolan 




     Everything the members of the Nixon Administration did or said in the early 1970s 
was in line with the Tar Baby choice, such as the address delivered by the Assistant 
Secretary of State David Newson in Chicago on September 17, 1970, who said that con-
tact with the outside world would help bring white rulers to better understand the need 
for change.
.  
194 To tell the truth, by reading the minutes of the conversation Newson him-
self had with the South African Prime Minister it does not seem that the white regimes 
would have gradually accepted change. As a matter of fact, John Vorster publicly said 
that discussion of apartheid could not be part of any dialogue.195
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     This did not cause any doubt in the U.S. policy, and Nixon’s second State of the Un-
ion Address was not different from the one delivered in 1970. Despite the repression of 
any attempt of emancipation towards majority rule, the President stated again that his 
Administration wanted to encourage the white regimes of Southern Africa to adopt 
more generous and realistic policies towards the needs of their black citizens, but the 
violent solution to the problems of racial discrimination was always excluded as an ob-
stacle to evolutionary change. In a word, isolation of the white governments was not on 
the agenda.196
     Meanwhile, Chinese communist activities in the black continent were always being 
monitored. In a few words, the revolutionary struggle against colonialism and imperial-
ism was to be fought through the arming and training of national liberation groups, the 
support to regimes deemed truly revolutionary and the aid to political dissidents in pro-
West African countries. Actually, such a programme distinguished the Chinese from the 
more moderate line taken by Moscow, so much so that that initially Beijing had sup-
ported subversive actions in some of the regimes the Soviets were courting. In fact, the 
Russians condemned Mao for being too irresponsible and reckless, ignoring political 
and economic reality in individual States and setting the Africans against the USSR and 
the rest of the socialist bloc. Zambia and Tanzania had by far become the leading sup-
porters of liberation movements in Southern Africa and the Tanzam Railway the Chi-
nese were building, and which was to give Lusaka access to the sea through a friendly 
country, rather than through the Portuguese territories, was expected to reduce Zambia’s 




     One of the aims of the Americans, instead, was to encourage, wherever possible, the 
various liberation movements to detach themselves from over-dependence on Sino-
Soviet assistance, by continuing discreet contact with the leadership, giving help to pro-
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West leaders and their movements, short of supplying weapons and military equipment, 
and providing educational and humanitarian assistance to refugees.198
     British reports seemed a sort of photocopy of the American ones. All declarations of 
intent were nice words towards what the government deemed as granted, that is the con-
tinuation of white minority rule in Southern Africa. However, as concerned Portugal, 
British analyses considered that the difficulties of her position would finally lead to 
withdrawal from Africa in the 1980s. Moreover, it was stated that a higher standard of 
living in metropolitan Portugal and the manpower demands of industrialisation, once the 
country’s economic development was bound up to the rest of Western Europe, would 
make it hard for the government to support the large armed forces necessary to maintain 
control of overseas provinces. Apart from this, Portugal was already regarded as the 
most vulnerable target in Southern Africa, thus national liberation movements were 
growing in strength and effectiveness and the two communist powers were also ex-
pected to gain from tensions between black Africa and Southern white regimes.
     
199
     Despite Cold War analyses and interpretations, the British experts stated that Africa 
would remain an area of relatively low priority for the Soviet Union, despite a growing 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean and considerable opportunities in some States like 
Zambia and Kenya. As concerned Britain, Black Africa was expected to remain of long 
term importance, as a market and as a source of raw materials, while investments and 
trade with South Africa were always substantial and profitable, though ongoing tensions 
in the area were supposed to lead to a reduction of London’s economic stake. What is 
important to highlight is that the document stressed that, whatever the internal situation 
of individual black States, nothing would affect the attitude to white supremacy in 
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Southern Africa. Racial discrimination was bound to remain an emotional issue causing 
humiliation to the whole black population, regardless of the political system and eco-
nomic development level.200
     This was exactly what the Atlantic powers seemed to ignore. No matter how devel-
oped black African States might have been and what kind of alliance they might have 
chosen. Self-determination and majority rule had by then become the only issue about 
which no compromise was possible. Apart from statesmen like Kaunda and Nyerere, 
under the name of Black Consciousness and with the leadership of some young activists 
like Steve Biko, students argued that blacks should first develop heir own cultural 
strength. Biko said that the blacks had been convinced to be really inferior. African cul-
ture had been associated to a sort of sub-culture purely because African people were 
only trying to mimicking the white man’s way of living. Therefore, the first thing to do 




     Colonialism not only took land away from those who had been living there for ages, 




     Biko claimed that Africans had to accept themselves the way they were as a first step 
along the path of freedom.
  
203
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